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WALKING THE BEACH TO THE CORE OF SOVEREIGNTY:
THE HISTORIC BASIS FOR THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
APPLIED IN GLASS V GOECKEL
Robert Haskell Abrams*
In 2004, a split panel of the Michigan Court of Appeals announced its conclu-
sion that Michigan littoral owners of property owned to the water's very edge and
could exclude members of the public from walking on the beach. In that instant
almost 3300 miles of the Great Lakes foreshore became, in theory and in law,
closed to public use. The case became the leading flash point of controversy between
the vast public and ardent private property rights groups. A little more than one
year later, the Michigan Supreme Court reversed that ruling as errant on public
trust grounds and returned the legal rule to what had been the long accustomed
practice-that the public enjoyed rights to traverse the Great Lakes coast of Michi-
gan below the ordinary high-water mark. This Article offers extensive historical
support for the public trust positions taken by the Michigan Supreme Court drawn
from the Romans, the Medieval period in which modern concepts of sovereignty de-
rived, and the English and American uses of the doctrine up through the end of
the nineteenth century. These sources demonstrate that the public rights of use of
the foreshore of this nation's great waters, including the Great Lakes, derive from
the very essence of sovereignty as it is embedded in the American system of govern-
ment. Accordingly, the public trust doctrine as received and expounded in this
country is properly conceived of as an inherent limitation on the sovereign that no
branch of government at either the state orfederal level is free to ignore.
The Great Lakes are special; they are inland seas that hold one-
fifth of the world's fresh surface water. The lakes are public re-
sources that provide all citizens of the region with beauty and
navigational and recreational opportunities of great value and im-
portance. My Great Lakes experience compares with that of many.
I grew up in Chicago a few hundred yards from Lake Michigan and
spent a week or two during many summers along the lake's eastern
shore in both Indiana and Michigan. Later, as the cycle of my life
turned, I took my own children to spend part of their summer on
several of those same beaches. We enjoyed the miles of lakefront,
sometimes hiking along the beach, looking for the best waves or
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dunes or sand castle sites, other times walking back from where the
wind and waves had pushed us, greeting the people fishing, shell
collecting, or simply walking the beach. Looking shoreward from
the water, there was always beach that everyone used, then the
vegetation line, and above that there were dunes or gullies leading
to the higher ground upon which were found private homes or
resorts.
Almost without warning, a simple back lot-front lot easement
dispute mutated into a threat to the public right to walk these
shores-a right as old and venerable as the legal system itself.
When Richard Goeckel and his wife Kathleen purchased lakefront
property on Lake Huron in Alcona County, Michigan, the property
was burdened by an express easement in favor of Joan Glass.'
Goeckel2 resisted Glass' use of the easement to the point where
Glass sued to enforce its terms.' Goeckel initially asserted a coun-
terclaim sounding in trespass, claiming use by Glass that exceeded
the permissible extent of the easement. Goeckel later amended
that pleading to add a separate counterclaim alleging that Glass
had no right to do what she and millions of other users of Great
Lakes beaches in Michigan had always done: walk laterally near the
water's edge.4 Goeckel asserted this counterclaim even though in
deposition he admitted that he had no objection to Glass' practice
and that he and others also regularly walked the beaches in front
of the lands of the upland riparians. He went so far as to admit in
his deposition that his view comported with the near-universal un-
derstanding of the relative rights to the beach at the water's edge:
the right lay with the public.
Q. Do strangers walk along the beach in front of your
property on a regular basis?
A. Yes.
1. Joan Glass had held and used this easement continuously since 1967; the Goeckels
bought the property over which the easement lies in 1997. Glass v. Goeckel, 683 N.W.2d.
719, 721 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004).
2. For the sake of simplicity, the term Goeckel is used rather than the plural even
though the suit was filed in both names. Glass, 683 N.W.2d. at 721. Richard Goeckel was
more active in the litigated events of the case. Pictures of the Glass v. Goeckel parties may
be found at http://detnews.com/2005/metro/0503/1O/CO7-112832.htm and http://
www.record-eagle.com/2005/feb/27beach.htn.
3. Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58, 63 (Mich. 2005). See also Letter from Pamela Burt,
Attorney for Glass, to Author (Oct. 26, 2006) (on file with University of Michigan Journal of
Law Reform).
4. First Amended Counter Complaint at 21a, Glass v. Goeckel, No. 01-10713-CH(K)
(Mich. Cir. Ct. Sept. 12, 2001).
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Q. Travel over your property and other beach-front prop-
erties?
A. They're not traveling over my property. They're travel-
ing next to the water's edge, which is the State of
Michigan's property.
Q. Do you walk yourself along the beach near the water
line traveling across other people's property?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. That is the custom, as you understand it, for people to
walk the beach freely along near the water?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. You indicated that you have no problem with
strangers or anyone walking along the beach near
the water's edge?
A. That's correct.
Q. And would that include walking on dry sand next to
the water's edge? And by next to it I mean within a
foot of the water's edge or two.
A. I have no problem with anybody doing that.
Q. So when people walk by on the beach in front of your
home they don't walk in the water, their feet aren't
wet?
A. That's fairly-that's pretty general. Some people walk
in the water, some people walk on the sand. De-
pends if they got shoes on or they're barefoot.
5
This colloquy gave no hint of the devastating abnegation of es-
tablished public rights that, for slightly more than a year's time,
emerged from this case. Indeed, Goeckel's words were a virtual
admission that the counterclaim sounding in trespass along the
water's edge was without legal merit and was not consonant with
longstanding universal understandings acknowledged by both the
public and upland riparians, including Goeckel himself.
6
5. Deposition of Richard A. Goeckel at 17-19, 35, Glass v. Goeckel, No. 01-10713-
CH(K) (Mich. Cir. Ct. Sept. 12, 2001).
6. The Glass case did not make a record on existing practice in regard to what areas
of the foreshore have been historically used by the public and the nature of these uses. Re-
ports in the press, however, leave no doubt that the public was accustomed to using the dry
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In the circuit court, after hearing argument on cross motions for
summary judgment,' the trial judge brokered an agreement of the
express easement issues and, together with making an explicit rul-
ing in favor of Glass rejecting the lateral trespass claim and
recognizing the public right to walk along the beach, entered a
judgment in favor of Glass.8 The case should have ended there.
Goeckel did not adhere to the agreed settlement on the express
easement issue. He subsequently was held in contempt and en-
joined from further interference with the easement, and Glass was
awarded attorney's fees.9 According to Pam Burt, counsel for Glass,
the award of fees apparently incensed Goeckel, and was the most
likely reason for the appeal. The appeal initially centered on the
fee award, and seemed to add a challenge to the beach walking
ruling favoring the public as an afterthought.0 The fee award was
dismissed on the ground that, as a post-judgment matter, it lay out-
side of the appellate jurisdiction of the court of appeals." A full
seventeen months after Goeckel's appeal was filed, and ten months
after amici ordinarily are permitted to file by court rules,l2 a radical
sand areas of the beach up to what was the apparent high-water mark for walking and other
pursuits. See, e.g., John Flesher, Sandy Footsteps Lead to Court: Case Could Decide Who Can Walk
on Beach, TRAVERSE CITY RECORD EAGLE, Feb. 27, 2005, http://www.record-eagle.com/
2005/feb/27beach.htm; Keith Schneider, Michigan Supreme Court Asked to Draw Line in the
Sand: Arguments Heard to Allow or Ban Public from Great Lakes Beaches, GREAT LAKES BULLETIN
NEWS SERVICE, Mar. 19, 2005, http://www.mlui.org/landwater/fullarticle.asp?fileid=16829.
When the Court of Appeals decision was first announced, it was described as "unexpected"
in that it undercut longstanding practice. SeeJess Piskor, Court's Unexpected Order: Keep Off the
Beach!, Great Lakes Bulletin News Service, July 4, 2004, available at http://www.mlui.org/
landwater/fullarticle.asp?fileid=16718. The majority in Glass, in its discussion of using the
public trust to protect "traditional" public rights, stated that: "[w]alking the lakeshore below
the ordinary high water mark is just such an activity, because gaining access to the Great
Lakes to hunt, fish, or boat required walking to reach the water .... Consequently, the pub-
lic has always held a right of passage in and along the lakes." Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W. 2d.
58, 74.
7. First Amended Complaint at 23a, Glass v. Goeckel, No. 01-10713-CH(K) (Mich. Cir.
Ct. Sept. 12, 2001). After the amended answer of Goeckel added the counterclaim relating
to beach walking, Plaintiff Glass added a count for a declaration of her right, and that of the
public, to walk along the water's edge below the ordinary high-water mark.
8. Glass v. Goeckel, No. 01-10713-CH(K) (Mich. Cir. Ct. June 25, 2002) (order estab-
lishing easement rights); Glass v. Goeckel, No. 01-10713-CH(K) (Mich. Cir. Ct. Apr. 3, 2002)
(trial court opinion).
9. Letter from Pamela Burt, supra note 3.
10. Id.
11. Glass v. Goeckel, No. 01-10713-CH(K) (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 22, 2002) (order re-
garding contempt of court and amending order establishing easement rights).
12. Michigan Court Rule 7.212(H) governs the filing of an amicus brief with the Court
of Appeals, and states, in relevant part: "An amicus curiae brief may be filed only on motion
granted by the Court of Appeals. The motion must be filed within 21 days after the appel-
lee's brief is filed."
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private property rights organization that had chosen for itself the
public-spirited sounding name Save Our Shoreline (SOS), received
special leave of court to file an amicus brief in the case on behalf of
Goeckel.' The SOS brief seized on dicta in a 1930 Michigan Su-
preme Court Great Lakes reliction case, Hilt v. Weber," that had
incautiously taken language from a Wisconsin inland lakes case
stating that the public has no right of passage over dry land be-
tween the low- and high-water mark because exclusive use is in the
riparian owner, although the title is in the state.16
The stage was set for a judicial overreaching of almost unimag-
inable magnitude. The impact of the Michigan Court of Appeals
action dwarfs the infamous conduct of the Illinois Legislature in
the landmark public trust case of Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illi-
nois.17 In Illinois Central, granting the port area fronting Chicago to
private control was held to be illegal, an alienation of sovereignty
that undercut the ability of subsequent legislatures to govern in the
public interest.' In Glass, the court of appeals, in a stunning deci-
sion, privatized the entire Michigan Great Lakes foreshore area by
13. The initial claim of appeal from the circuit court was filed by the Goeckels on
6/15/2002; Ms. Glass' first Appellee's brief was timely filed on 12/26/2002; Ms. Glass timely
filed an amended Appellee's brief on 01/23/2003 in response to an amended Appellant's
brief filed by the Goeckels on 01/16/2003 in response to a 1/10/2003 court order. See
Docket, Glass v. Goeckel, 683 N.W.2d 719 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004) (No. 242641). SOS' first
attempt to file an amicus brief was denied as untimely on 12/03/2003; SOS then filed a
motion to extend time to file a motion to file an amicus brief on 12/08/2003, and this mo-
tion was granted (and SOS's amicus brief accepted) on 12/18/2003. See id.
14. Hilt v. Weber, 233 N.W. 159 (Mich. 1930).
15. Parcels adjoining lakes and other standing bodies of water are properly called "lit-
toral" and tracts along flowing water are called "riparian." See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY
1327 (6th ed. 1990). In common usage and in relevant legal content, littoral parcels are
often described as riparian, because of that term's more general content associating it with
adjacency to the water. Id. The Glass court properly uses the term "littoral" in describing
parcels that are next to the Great Lakes, see JOSEPH L. SAX ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WA-
TER RESOURCES 28 (4th ed. 2006), but many of the precedents do not use that same
terminology and instead refer to lakeside parcels as riparian. This Article will use the term
riparian to describe littoral parcels unless the use of the term littoral is necessitated by the
context, such as describing the Glass opinions.
16. Hilt, 233 N.W. at 168 (citing Doemel v. Jantz, 193 N.W. 393 (Wis. 1923) (involving
Lake Winnebago, a meandered inland lake)).
17. Il. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892). An interesting attempt to recast
the action of the Illinois legislature in a more flattering light recently appeared. SeeJoseph
D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Origins of the American Public Trust Doctrine: What Really
Happened in Illinois Central, 71 U. CHI. L. REv. 799 (2004). As discussed more fully below,
even if the action of the Illinois legislature was not the perfidious giveaway that many have
thought it to be, the principle of the case is unaltered-the sovereign cannot act in ways that
are incompatible with its solemn trust obligations to the people whom it serves and for
whom it must exercise its fiduciary duty to preserve trust assets. See infra notes 162-174.
18. Illinois Centra 146 U.S. 387.
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denying any public rights or usufructs in land that was not inun-
dated by the water of the Great Lakes at the moment of use.19
Given that the prior usage had uniformly allowed the public use of
the foreshore area to the high-water mark, that decision worked an
immediate transfer of rights" from the public to the private ripar-
ian owners that affected the 3288 linear miles of Michigan's Great
Lakes shoreline.2'
The Michigan Supreme Court granted leave to appeal2  and in a
five-two decision reversed the Court of Appeals.2 The five member
majority opinion, authored by Justice Corrigan, held for Glass and
in favor of the asserted public rights that attached under the public
trust doctrine without regard to where legal title lay:
24
[W]hen the state (or entities that predated our state's admis-
sion to the Union) conveyed littoral property to private
parties, that property remained subject to the public trust. In
this case, the property now owned by defendants was origi-
nally conveyed subject to specific public trust rights in Lake Huron
and its shores up to the ordinary high water mark. The ordinary
high water mark lies, as described by Wisconsin, another
Great Lakes state, where "the presence and action of the wa-
ter is so continuous as to leave a distinct mark either by
erosion, destruction of terrestrial vegetation, or other easily
recognized characteristic.,
25
19. Glass v. Goekel, 683 N.W.2d 719 (2004).
20. This Article will try to maintain a distinction between rights and usufructs on the
one hand, and title or ownership on the other. Pragmatically, the rights and usufructs are
most vital because, in all of the relevant regards, the important public interests are satisfied
by use of the foreshore regardless of title and ownership. Title and ownership may be rele-
vant in matters that are not of broad public concern, such as mineral deposits. See infra note
216.
21. See State of Michigan, Shorelines of the Great Lakes, http://www.michigan.gov/
som/0,1607,7-192-2993830245-15959-,00.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2007).
22. Glass v. Goeckel, 688 N.W.2d 91 (Mich. 2004).
23. Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58 (Mich. 2005).
24. The majority assumed the case under decision was one "where a private landowner
ostensibly holds title to the water's edge." Id. at 61.
25. Id. at 62 (citing State v. Trudeau, 408 N.W.2d 337 (Wis. 1987)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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The two dissenters would have allowed the public access to
walk or use the foreshore in furtherance of other public trust pur-
poses only in the water, or on the wet sand. Justice Young stated, "I
believe it is only in this area of wet shoreline that the public may
walk., 27 Justice Markman summarized his view as follows: "the litto-
ral property owner's title extends to unsubmerged land and the
public's legal rights under the public trust doctrine extend to the
submerged lands, including the wet sands."
2
Although the court majority staved off a grave threat to estab-
lished public rights, the Glass case did not put the matter fully to
rest. On a host of fronts, private property rights groups are claim-
ing that government has overstepped the line and taken or
debased their rights.29 Justice Markman's dissent was particularly
acerbic, accusing the majority of a litany of errors in the applica-
tion of both doctrine and precedent.3 0 Its fervor and veneer of
logical consistency, although built on a totally flawed premise, will
allow it to be replayed by litigants in other fora. Indeed, SOS is not
the only group seeking privatization of the foreshore of the Great
Lakes. In the neighboring state of Ohio, private riparian owners
are seeking, through judicial" and legislative means, to appropri-
ate public property rights into exclusionary private ownership, and
to extinguish public usufructs along the shore of Lake Erie. Of
26. The dissenters were justices Young and Markman. All members of the court agreed
that the case was not controlled by the Michigan Great Lakes Submerged Lands Act, MICH.
COMP. LAws. §§ 324.32501-324.32516 (2006), upon which the trial court had relied in fix-
ing the high-water mark. See Glass, 703 N.W.2d at 62-63, 66, 79-81 (Young, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part), 95, 97 (Markman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Ac-
cordingly, the opinions here referred to as dissenting, are opinions that concur in part.
27. Id. at 79 (Young,J., dissenting).
28. Id. at 107 (Markman,J., dissenting) (internal citation omitted).
29. See infra text accompanying note 31; see also Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist.
v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313 (2001) (finding a taking when federal water deliveries with-
held to protect endangered species).
30. Id. at 81-82.
31. See First Amended Complaint, Ohio ex rel. Merrill v. Ohio, No. 04 CV 00 1080
(Ohio Ct. Common Pleas, Lake County Ohio 2004), available at http://
ohiolakefrontgroup.com/documents/FirstAmendedComplaint.pdf; Motion for More Defi-
nite Statement, Ohio ex rel. Merrill v. Ohio, No. 04 CV 00 1080 (Ohio Ct. Common Pleas,
Lake County Ohio 2004), available at http://www.ohiolakefrontgroup.com/
documents/AGMotion.pdf; see also Ohio Lakefront Group website, http://
www.ohiolakefrontgroup.com (providing general information about this lawsuit).
32. H.B. 218, 125th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2003-04), available at
http://www.legislature.state.oh.us/bills.cfm?ID=125_HB_218; see also Testimony of the Ohio
Lakefront Group, available at http://www.ohiolakefrontgroup.com/testimony.html; Stepha-
nie Showalter, Ohio H.B. 218-An Update (on file with the University of Michigan Journal
of Law Reform) (providing additional information about the Ohio legislation).
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importance to the Ohio groups, Justice Markman's opinion sug-
gested that the public trust, because it is a property law concept, is
entirely a matter of state law, leaving each state free to choose for
itself the extent of protection to be given.3 In the end, however,
the ongoing private property rights effort in Ohio seeks wholesale
abdication of governmental control and responsibility for the vital
foreshore area of the Great Lakes.34 That result, like the one sought
by Goeckel, SOS and others in the Glass case, is so radical and in-
imical to the public-whom government serves-that government
itself is debarred from acting in that manner. It is along that path
that walking the beach leads to the core of sovereignty.35
This Article will explore why the public trust doctrine, as applied
in Glass v. Goeckel, is so clearly established as a core element in the
American concept of state sovereignty. The application of these
core principles in Glass is not only correct, but is consonant with
the decisional law in other Great Lakes States.36
This Article focuses its analysis on the "great waters" of the
United States. This is a term of art chosen for this particular pur-
pose-to describe at a minimum the oceans, including the Gulf of
Mexico, the bays, the Great Lakes, and the other great inland wa-
terways of this nation. This terminology facilitates this Article's
most pressing purpose: to defend against the contemporary attacks
on the public property interests and public rights of use in the
Great Lakes foreshore. Accordingly, within that subset comprising
the "great waters," most of the analytical effort will be directed to
the Great Lakes, as the law applied to them is an extension of the
law of the nation's sea coasts. As the Glass case, the strident dissent
33. Glass, 703 N.W.2d at 93-94. Markman's assertion is incorrect, as there is a consid-
erable minimum of public trust protection that is obligatory on the states. See Charles F
Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some Thoughts on the Source and Scope of the Tradi-
tionalDoctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 425 (1989); see also infra notes 226-230.
34. The Ohio Lakefront Group provides an illustration of their position on its website,
showing areas below the ordinary high-water mark as being, "Your Deeded Private Property"
and "Land the ODNR [Ohio Department of Natural Resources] has taken from you." See
Ohio Lakefront Group, http://www.ohiolakefrontgroup.com/steal your_land.html (last
visited May 4, 2007).
35. A similarly mundane occurrence almost two centuries ago prompted a similarly
global view of the law involved. In that instance, Justice Rossell of the New Jersey Supreme
Court observed that a dispute over "the taking of a few bushels [of] oysters" posed a case
"affecting the rights of all our citizens, and embracing, in their investigation, the laws of
nations and of England, the relative rights of sovereign and subjects, as well as the municipal
regulations of our own country." Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 79 (1821).
36. See infra text accompanying notes 174-205.
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of Justice Markman, and the Ohio efforts all demonstrate, public
rights in the Great Lakes region are, and remain, under attack.
The legal defense mounted in this Article will offer additional sup-
port for the position of the Glass majority and show that the
privatization of the Great Lakes foreshore is, in addition to being
bad policy, quite literally beyond the authority of the state.
The subjects examined and the conclusions reached in this Arti-
cle are neither wholly new nor are they without respectable
precedent. Rather, they are an emanation of the well established
public trust doctrine. Its power to constrain governmental activity
has been a prominent part of American jurisprudence since Justice
Field's 1892 majority opinion in Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois.37
Even so, the nature of the public trust, particularly its obligatory
aspects in a federal system and its application to all branches of the
government, is less well understood. Additionally, this Article will
explore one of the more difficult aspects of the Michigan Supreme
Court's Glass decision: the migration of the public trust doctrine to
the non-tidal great waters of the United States from its Roman and
English origins, where the doctrine and its legal antecedents were
originally developed in relation to tidal waters. Using the lens of
history and the relationship of public trust law to the law of accre-
tion, reliction, erosion, and submergence, this Article will further
support the Glass majority's conclusion that public rights do not
end at the literal, moment-to-moment line that is the water's edge.
The rights that have been secured for the public extend to the
highest point reached by the water on a predictable basis.
I. TAKING THE LONG VIEW: PRECURSORS OF THE AMERICAN LAW
OF THE FORESHORE AND RIPARIAN BOUNDARIES
Almost as long as there have been nations that embraced no-
tions of both nationhood and private property ownership, there
has been a potential need to adjust the public and private interests
at the water's edge. As an historical matter, many aspects of the re-
lationship were physically determined-the great waters were
resistant to efforts of individuals in pre-industrial and early post-
industrial societies to exert any meaningful control over them.8
37. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
38. When such societies found it necessary to "manage" water for the benefit of society
by using great rivers for irrigation, the historic result was a "hydraulic society" that featured
centralized governmental control of the entire society to produce the labor and managerial
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That alone precluded establishing key hallmarks of private prop-
erty: the ability to exercise ongoing control and the right to
exclude others. Those physical limitations combined with an inde-
pendent normative belief that the great waters themselves should
be public. That belief, beyond being pragmatic, was also utilitarian,
centered on the recognition that there was a true societal common
benefit in allowing the great waters to be treated as a commons to
support navigation, fishery, and bathing by as much of the popu-
lous as could conveniently carry on those uses.39 The resultant legal
regime recognized paramount public interests in the great waters
themselves and in the foreshore adjacent to them.4 ° On the fast
lands above the reach of the great waters, private riparians could,
in contrast, build permanent structures and fences that would not
be washed away and could realistically exercise dominion and ex-
clude others from those areas.4' The potential for conflict between
the public and its uses of the great waters and the upland riparians
and their desire to utilize the adjacent areas between their upland
parcels and the water was centered on the foreshore area. This re-
quired legal rules of mediation applicable to the foreshore alone.
A. The Roman law of Foreshore Property Rights and Usufructs
Roman law has roots as old as the seventh century B.C., but as a
developed and coherent legal system susceptible to modern study,
the third through sixth centuries A.D. are the usual focal point,
characterized first by the Institutes of Gaius and later by those of
Justinian and the Digests commenting on those codes.42 The com-
prehensive codification undertaken by the Emperor Justinian in
the sixth century A.D. usually marks the starting place for the dis-
cussion of the law affecting the great waters. 3 Justinian's Institutes
delineated private and public rights at the foreshore and estab-
conditions that would allow the construction of waterworks capable of manipulating the
water. See generally KARL A. WITTFOGEL, ORIENTAL DESPOTISM (Yale Univ. Press 1957).
39. See generally Carol Rose, The Comedy Of The Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inher-
ently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 711 (1986).
40. See infta notes 44-50.
41. See infta notes 51-53.
42. See ALAN WATSON, ROMAN LAW AND COMPARATIVE LAW 3 (1991). The work of
Justinian went far beyond the codification represented by the Institutes and included the
Digests which recorded the ideas of the period's commentators. Id. at 84-85.
43. Id. Emperor Justinian's codification of the law in the sixth century AD. gave later
lawyers a relatively short but comprehensive account of a highly developed legal system that
made an easy model to copy.
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lished rules of boundary adjustment within that zone, particularly
the rules governing accretion and erosion."
In the area of property law, Roman law employed classification
to great advantage. 5 Classifications were developed based on ge-
neric characteristics and, once things were properly sorted by class,
a particular legal rule would be applied to that class of things. 6
Property law, under the Romans, was a particularly good example
of classificatory jurisprudence and "Roman jurists were accustomed
to classify property in several ways, according to various differences
in its nature and relations.0
7
In relation to the great waters, the Institutes ofJustinian put the
matter rather plainly. The relevant paragraphs are set forth in full:
(1) By natural law the following things belong to all men,
namely: air, running water, the sea, and for this reason the
shores of the sea. No one, therefore, is prohibited from ap-
proaching the seashore if he avoids damaging houses,
monuments, and other structures, because they are not, like
the sea, subject to the Law of Nations.
(2) All rivers and ports are also public, and therefore the right
of fishing in a harbor or in streams is common to all.
(3) The shore of the sea extends to the point attained by the
highest tide in winter.
(4) The public use of the banks of rivers is also subject to the
Law of Nations, just as the use of the river itself is; and hence
anyone has a right to secure a vessel to them, to fasten ropes
to trees growing there, or to deposit any cargo thereon, just as
he has to navigate the river itself; but the ownership of the
same is in those whose lands are adjacent, and therefore the
trees growing there belong to them.
(5) The public use of the sea-shore is also subject to the Law
of Nations in like manner as that of the sea itself, and
44. See infra notes 50-62.
45. "The Roman jurists' delight in classification is well demonstrated in property law."
WATSON, supra note 42, at 44.
46. See, e.g., SEYMOUR F. HARRIS, THE ELEMENTS OF ROMAN LAW SUMMARIZED 19-27
(photo. reprint 1994) (2d ed., rev. 1889) (abstracting Roman law into tabular form based on
classifications).
47. JAMES HADLEY, INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 155 (photo. reprint 1996) (1873).
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therefore any person has as good a right to build a house
there in which he can take refuge, as he has to dry his nets or
to draw them out of the sea. The ownership of the shores,
must, however, be considered as belonging to no one, but to
be subject to the same law as the sea itself and the earth or
sand underneath it.
48
Reviewing Roman law classifications helps provide a fuller un-
derstanding of the passage from the Institutes of Justinian.
"Things" (including what has since become property) were divided
into things pious ("res divinijuris") and things secular ("res humani
juris"), with the latter category further subdivided into res privatae
and res publicae.49 Although some things in the broad class of res pub-
licae, such as the public funds in the public treasury could be the
subject of ordinary business relations:
[0] ther things again could not be dealt in, because they were
communia omnium, the common property of all men, not sub-
ject to the special control of individuals or communities. So
the air, the running river, the sea and with it the sea-shore, as
far in as the sea reaches at high tide--over these things no-
body can exert an exclusive power.50
That same writer observed that Roman law did allow some pri-
vate usufructs to be created in relation to the comminia omnium.
Given the technologies and the practices of the period, these were
small uses that increased the private benefit derived from the water
resource, but invariably did so without prejudice to the ongoing
use of the resource by the larger public. He describes two exam-
ples, taking water out of a stream to fill a private pond, and
enclosing areas waterward of the high tide line.51 In the former
case, the usufruct is to the quantum of water appropriated;52 in the
latter case the use is exclusive so long as the enclosure is main-
tained, but is lost when the water sweeps away the enclosure. 3
The rule allowing the enclosure or exclusive use of parts of the
foreshore of the great waters is also quite limited. Alan Watson, a
48. J. INST. 2.1.1-.5 (Samuel P. Scott trans., 1932).
49. HADLEY, supra note 47, at 155-56.
50. Id. at 157.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 157-58. The idea of appropriation as the basis for establishing rights to use
water is at the heart of the dominant water law in the more arid portions of the United
States and has a long history in many post-Roman settings.
53. Id.; see infra notes 54-59.
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Roman law scholar, espouses a view of privatization of the fore-
shore that calls attention to the hegemony of the public interest
over the private interest in the res publica.
Things under human law were either public (res publicae) or
private (res privatae). Res publicae were things belonging to the
state, such as roads, navigable rivers, and harbors. Riverbanks
were owned privately but their use was public; anyone could
tie up his boat to trees that grew there. Another classification
described some things as common to all (res communes): the
air, running water, and the sea; and these too could not be
owned. According to one early classical jurist, the seashore up
to the high-water mark of the winter tides was public; accord-
ing to a later one and to Justinian, the seashore was common
to all. No one could build on it as a matter of right, but per-
mission might be granted by the magistrates to erect a shelter,
which, however, would give no property rights in the soil.54
During this period, the right to enclose areas of the foreshore
for exclusive use as allowed by Institutes 2.1.5 did not, realistically,
amount to much. The "private" uses allowed were for the building
of huts, the drying of nets, and so forth.55 These "privatizations"
actually increased the public use of the foreshore. These were uses
that increased the private value and, hence, total public value, of
the resource by increasing the ability of all members of the society
to obtain greater benefits from the sea and the foreshore. Equally
telling, in the event that privatizations proved a threat to public use
of the waters and the foreshore, Roman law subordinated them to
the public uses. In her book-length monograph on the public trust,
Helen Althaus makes this point quite strongly, relying on the cross
translation of section 2.1.5 of Justinian's Institutes and the analysis
of W. A. Hunter:
The use by the public of the shores is part of the Jus Gentium
just as is the use of the sea itself. And therefore it is free to any-
one to place a hut there to which to betake himself, or to dry nets there,
or to haul them up from the sea. But of those shores it is understood
54. WATSON, supra note 42, at 44.
55. See infra notes 56-59.
SUMMER 2007]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
that no man is owner;, for they come under the same rules of law
as the sea itself and the underlying earth or sand.
56
Hunter expanded on the common use of the shores for fish-
ing, with reference to parallel provisions of the Digests. 7 For
example, he noted a famous rescript (advisory opinion) is-
sued to the fishermen of Formaie and Capena who had
sought a ruling about use of the foreshore. In setting out their
private rights of use of the foreshore, the commentator Anto-
nius Pius stated that the right to build huts or to place pilings
gave rights for only so long as the sea allowed it, for "when it
fell into ruins, the soil reverted to its former state as a res communis,
which any other person might build upon."8 Even more im-
portant for public rights and their primacy, the Digests stated
that "anyone could forbid the erection of a pier or other construction
that would interfere with his use of the sea or beach."59
Clearly, in establishing a universal right to enjoin structures that
interfere with the use of the sea or beach, a principle emerged
from the Roman law commentators and the subsequent Roman
law scholars that no privatization diminishing public use was al-
lowed. 6° The principle had the effect of maximizing the sum of
public benefits flowing from the resource. The law allowed non-
injurious private uses that assisted those individuals making the
private use, but importantly, the persons entitled to make those
private uses included the general public, not merely the adjacent
riparians6 Conflicting overuse of the great waters was unlikely
given existing technologies. Like the special status of riparians in
later centuries that allowed them to wharf out to deeper water,62
56. HELEN F. ALTHAUS, PUBLIC TRUST RIGHTS 4 (1978) (citing J. INST. 2.1.5; W.
HUNTER, ROMAN LAW 310 (J. Cross trans., 4th ed. 1903)) (emphasis added [by Althaus]).
57. The Digests were the commentaries on the law by the legal scholars of that age.
WATSON, supra note 42, at 24--25, 84-85.
58. ALTHAUS, supra note 56, at 4 (citing DIG. 1.8.6.pr. & 1.8.10) (emphasis added [by
Adhaus]).
59. Id. (citing DIG. 43.8.3.1 & 43.8.4) (emphasis added [by Althaus]).
60. See supra notes 48-59 and accompanying text.
61. This is an important distinction because it underscores the fact that the "privatiza-
tion" allowed actually was in the service of broad use of the foreshore and was not in any way
meant to increase the exclusive control of the upland riparians at the expense of the public.
62. Riparians, unlike the public at large, still enjoy the right to wharf out so long as
they do not interfere with the paramount fights of the public in the use of the great waters.
See, e.g., Obrecht v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 105 N.W.2d 143, 149-51 (Mich. 1960). Conversely,
although the public trust doctrine permits the state government to wharf out in order to
provide water access to the public, the state may not wharf out in a way that compromises
privately owned fast lands above the high-water mark. See, e.g., Peterman v. Dep't of Natural
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Roman law privatization of the foreshore had the effect of maxi-
mizing total social benefits. Nevertheless, a limit on private use
came into play when the private use interfered with paramount
public rights. This same idea was largely preserved in English juris-
prudence. Although diluted somewhat by English royal practice,
English law allowed private ownership or usufructs that did not
burden the larger public interest.63 This was received as law in the
United States," and has not changed materially since Roman times.
The thrust of Roman law, when applied to the great bodies of
water, established the boundary of riparian tracts at the high-water
mark.65 Exclusive usufructuary interests that might be seen as akin
to "temporary tide" in the foreshore below high water could be
obtained by physical occupation by riparians or members of the
general public alike.66 Even so, recognition of such private interests
did not diminish the public usufruct in the foreshore area for pur-
poses related to the paramount public rights of navigation, fishery,
and bathing. That is a consistent theme in the Roman law that, as
will be shown, was reinvigorated when the English law of the fore-
shore was brought to the United States.67
B. Enduring Boundaries of the Foreshore of the Great Waters
While the Roman law, as reflected in Justiniain's Institutes, estab-
lished the primacy of public usufructs of the great waters, it is
important to remember the Roman law also placed a high value on
private property. One of the signal contributions of Roman law was
its formalization of concepts that remain fundamental in modern
property law. In that regard, Roman law recognized occupation as
Res., 521 N.W.2d 499, 510 (Mich. 1994). In Glass, Justice Corrigan relied on Peterman as
having previously and definitively established the ordinary high-water mark as the "landward
boundary of the public trust." Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58, 69 (Mich. 2005).
63. The Roman law roots and its anti-privatization branches of law declined in Eng-
land during the Dark Ages and the Saxon period, particularly with regard to exclusive
fisheries in important areas of tidal rivers. ALTHAUS, supra note 56, at 23 (citing William
Drayton, Note, The Public Trust in Tidal Areas: A Sometime Submerged Traditional Doctrine, 79
YALE L.J. 762, 764 (1970)). The reemergence of public rights born of the Roman law tradi-
tion began to take hold again around the time of Magna Carta in 1215. See infra note 101; see
also ALTHAUS, supra note 56, at 23-24; Note, The Public Trust in Tidal Areas: A Sometime Sub-
merged Traditional Doctrine, 79 YALE L.J. 762, 763-74 (1970).
64. See infra notes 167-174.
65. See supra note 47.
66. See supra notes 54-59.
67. See infra notes 113-174.
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a means of acquiring property, and once acquired as property,
owners enjoyed the right to exclude others.68 Strong public rights
in the great waters and strong private property rights in riparian
tracts that were subject to dominium posed a potential conflict in
relation to use of the foreshore. It seems inevitable that riparians
seeking to maximize the benefit of their riparian location would try
to extend their exclusive rights all the way to the very shore and
beyond.
As already seen, the Roman law resisted that waterward riparian
advance in two ways-(1) drawing the line marking the res com-69
munes at the point of high water and (2) allowing the public to
seek interdiction of private uses that interfered with public uses.
Simultaneously, however, Roman law strongly protected the private
property advantage of riparian proximity to the water by introduc-
ing the doctrine of accretion.7 °
The Romans were well aware that natural forces had the power
to permanently change the physical demarcation point between
land and water, and so prescribed a rule to govern the legal conse-
quences of those changes. The rule they adopted was solicitous of
the riparian's interests recognized by the jus privatum, but did not
harm the public interests. The Institutes ofJustinian, section 2.1.20
describes accretion:
(20) Moreover, whatever a river adds to your land by alluvial
soil belongs to you under the Law of Nations, for this deposit
is an indiscernible increase; and that which is added in this
manner is held to have been added so gradually that you can-
not ascertain how much is added at any moment of time.7
68. Amir A. Kakan, Evolution of American Law, From Its Roman Origin to the Present, 48
ORANGE COUNTY L. 31, 46 (Feb. 2006). See generally Woodman v. Pitman, 10 A. 321, 322 (Me.
1887) (awarding better right to ice upon a river based on occupancy; citing Roman law as
well as Blackstone and Kent for the proposition); WILLIAM L. BURDICK, THE PRINCIPLES OF
ROMAN LAW AND THEIR RELATION TO MODERN LAW (1938).
69. The law governing land adjoining rivers was different as to title, but not as to ef-
fect. Consider the commentary of the Roman digester Gaius, found in the Legal Doctrines
of Daily Application and Utility, Book II. "[P] ublic use of the banks of rivers is subject to the
Law of Nations ... [tiherefore, everyone is free to conduct a boat to the bank; to attach
ropes to trees growing there; to dry nets, and draw them up from the sea; and to deposit any
cargo thereon .... [O]wnership of the banks, however, is vested in those to whose land they
are contiguous ... ." DIG. 1.1.8.5 (Gaius, Legal Doctrines of Daily Application and Utility 2)
(Samuel P. Scott trans., 1932).
70. SeeJ. INST. 2.1.20 (Samuel P. Scott trans., 1932).
71. Id.
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Awarding accretions to the riparian proprietor 7 had the effect of
allowing a dynamic adjustment to the realities of the shore. Only
the boundaries moved in an effort to leave undisturbed the status
quo ante when it came to riparian locational advantage and public
uses. This form of adjustment of boundaries without disturbing the
relative rights of the private riparians and the public has continued
unbroken from the Romans to the present.
73
C. Sovereignty and the Foreshore in England
at the Time of the American Revolution
The Roman law concepts described above found their way into
Anglo-American law and jurisprudence with little alteration as to
their effect, but with considerably richer political, theoretical, and
doctrinal overlays. In Roman times, the Institutes of Justinian left
little room for doubt about the subjects of greatest immediate in-
terest-the rights to the great waters and the foreshore." Roman
law was less explicit in stating the rationale for the common owner-
ship of the foreshore. But the rules granting primacy to the public
at large were consistent with the belief that such resources were
incapable of private ownership in the usual Roman law sense-
being able to exercise dominion over the thing. 15 As previously de-
scribed, below the high tide line the law allowed limited exclusive
private use that might be washed away by the sea itself or might be
removed at the suit of any member of the public whose use of the
foreshore was impaired by the structure. 6 Men may have taken in-
dividual advantage of the great waters for fishing, navigation, or
bathing, but these uses did not require an exclusivity that was im-
possible to obtain. Conveniently, but with little explanation in the
Digest, the rules adopted by the Institutes of Justinian maximized
the public benefit from the great waters by classifying them as
72. See HADLEY, supra note 47 at 166 ("Once more, if new land was formed by alluvial
action, by soil carried down a stream and deposited on its banks or at its mouth, this new
land became the property of him whose land itjoined.").
73. The text here is primarily descriptive. The reasons for the accretion doctrine and
the related doctrines of reliction, erosion and submergence are more fully explored in post-
Roman law settings. See infra notes 207-218.
74. See supra text accompanying note 48.
75. See supra notes 54-59.
76. See supra notes 50-59.
SUMMER 2007]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
belonging to the res communes, while allowing complementary pri-
vate uses to be maintained.
7
Coming out of the Middle Ages, however, a second and more
theoretical tradition was added to the predecessors of Anglo-
American law that reinforced the Roman law res communes-based
public use and control of the foreshore area." The emerging na-
tion states began to explicate a concept of sovereignty that
considered not only the pragmatic needs of the emperor for gov-
erning, but also responsibilities of the sovereign, as an ongoing
entity, to the people subject to the sovereign's rule:
During the thirteenth century Roman and canon lawyers de-
veloped the idea that there were certain rights and functions
which a kingdom had to exercise if it was to exist and flourish.
Simultaneously they stressed the concept of the king not as
dominus in the absolute legal sense of the word, but rather as
guardian, curator, of the office and responsibilities entrusted
to him. Since the king was but a temporary official in a posi-
tion of trust, he might not alienate the essential functions of
his office to the prejudice of the state. 70
This concept may not sound immediately familiar, but it is a bul-
wark of contemporary American jurisprudence. It is recognized in
the operation of the public trust doctrine and also in other doc-
trines that limit or forbid acts of the sovereign that impair the
ability of the sovereign to govern on a continuing basis. s°
Looking more specifically at the Middle Ages in England, in the
thirteenth century, the monarchy was yet to be well established as a
center of authority over all of the barons."' Power, loyalty, and trib-
ute may well have had as much to do with the king's ultimate
ability to govern as did the law, but the law of inalienability was al-
ready in place and cited by the Crown, particularly when it was
77. See supra notes 54-59.
78. There is also a third interesting line of reasoning from the English Middle Ages
that places the foreshore in the Crown's ownership. It is the concept that those lands were
"waste lands" belonging to the Crown because of either their periodic inundation or aspect
as barren, unproductive beach sand that was incapable of cultivation. See, e.g., Shively v.
Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 11 (1892).
79. PETER N. RIESENBERG, INALIENABILITY OF SOVEREIGNTY IN MEDIEVAL POLITICAL
THOUGHT 3 (1956).
80. See, e.g., HaroldJ. Krent, Reconceptualizing Sovereign Immunity, 45 VAND. L. REv. 1529
(1992);Joshua I. Schwartz, Liability for Sovereign Acts: Congruence and Exceptionalism in Govern-
ment Contracts Law, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 633 (1996).
81. See generallyJ.C. HOLT, MAGNA CARTA & MEDIEVAL GOVERNMENT (1985).
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convenient to do so in the effort to regain lands and other rights
for the Crown. 2 Procedures and doctrines that are familiar today
are direct descendants of protections in use in that period. Quo
warranto, for example, was used in one thirteenth century case by
Edward I to attack his own prior action as beyond his own author-
ity.8s Importantly for present purposes, that case involved the claim
that the authority was lacking because the lands were inalienable
from the Crown. 4 Another inalienability doctrine, the rule that
prescription does not operate against the sovereign, 5 finds expres-
sion in the best-known legal commentary of this period. 6 In Peter
Riesenberg's words, in this period, "there was a protracted effort by
the monarchy to recover alienated lands and what it considered
the rights of the Crown; also an effort to retain unimpaired its
rightful freedom to govern.""7 Whether born of convenience,
pragmatism, or principle, the inalienability of sovereignty became
a structural part of Anglo-American jurisprudence in this period
and has remained a part since.
There is also a canonical link to the inalienability doctrines that
adds a complementary dimension of importance to Anglo-
American law.88 This existed when the United States was formed
and it continues in place today. That element is the view that the
sovereign is a trustee.89 This is a point of special relevance and pro-
bity in understanding the contours of the modern public trust
doctrine as it applies to cases like Glass and affects governance of
the great waters more generally. In the canonical view, the wealth
of nature was provided by the deity for the benefit of the people.90
This concept was folded into those of emerging sovereignty and
the attributes of the office of king by building a metaphor between
82. RIESENBERG, supra note 79, at 100.
83. See id. at 102 n.47.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 102-03 n.49; see also 94 C.J.S. Waters § 329 (2006) ("[N]o such right can be
acquired against a state .... ).
86. These were Brotton and Fleta. See RIESENBERG, supra note 79 at 102-03.
87. Id. at 103. Riesenberg notes that the Crown was not always successful in recovering
the alienated lands when it invoked these doctrines but argues that was not "all-important."
Id. What was important was establishing a principle that affected English constitutional de-
velopment and aligned the crown to the realm rather than to the person of the sitting king.
88. Id. at 100.
89. See infra notes 111-173.
90. FRITZ KERN, KINGSHIP AND LAW IN THE MIDDLE AGES 26-27 (S.B. Chrimes trans.,
1939).
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natural resources and the King's role as God's vicar on earth.91 Re-
sources were entrusted to the King as steward, to benefit the
people and the nation. One of the early iterations of this concept
in the Anglo-American tradition appears in the work of Henry of
Bracton, the most famous legal commentator of that period.92
To what extent were the public rights to the foreshore among
those things that were inalienable? Under Roman law, this was not
an open question because the great waters and the lands below the
highest tide were not only publicly owned, but they were consid-
ered in the class of things incapable of private ownership.
93
Although the context is a bit different, Bracton's rendition of the
matters addressed by those sections of the Justinian's Institutes gov-
erning the foreshore follows, in part, the phrasing of the Roman
law standard. It makes a significant departure, however:
By natural law these are common to all: running water, air, the
sea, and the shores of the sea, as though accessories of the
sea. No one therefore is forbidden access to the seashore,
provided he keeps away from houses and buildings [built
there], for by the jus gentium shores are not common to all in
the sense that the sea is, but buildings built there, whether in
the sea or on the shore, belong by the jus gentium to those
who build them. Thus in this case the soil cedes to the build-
ing, though elsewhere the contrary is true, the building cedes
to the soil.
9 4
As the first sentence shows, in the time of Bracton, the Roman
law classification of the great waters and their shores as public was
intact. Plainly, however, Bracton's interpretation of English law, as
he understood it in the mid-thirteenth century, tolerated the erec-
tion of private structures in the foreshore, possibly beyond what
Roman law would have allowed.95 The balance was a bit different
for technological and political reasons. Politically, Bracton's world
had seen a number of centuries in which the more decentralized
91. See, e.g., Guy I. Seidman, The Origins Of Accountability: Everything I Know About The
Sovereign's Immunity, I Learned From King Henry III, 49 ST. Louis U. L.J. 393, 411-12 (2005).
92. See 2 HENRY DE BRACTON, ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 305 (Samuel
E. Thorne trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1968) (1569), available at http://hlsl.law.harvard.edu/
bracton/Unframed/English/v2/305.htm.
93. See supra note 50.
94. 2 BRACTON, supra note 92, at 39-40.
95. See, e.g., HUNTER, supra note 56, at 310. (explaining that Roman Digests allowed
anyone to move for an interdict if the structures interfered with the public use of the sea or
the beach).
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baronies and the Saxons had been tolerant of more exclusionary
practices, especially in regard to fisheries.96 Even by Bracton's time,
however, and even taking into account grants of exclusive fisheries
and the erection of fish weirs, Medieval forms of privatization of
the res communes did not have the effect of barring concurrent pub-
lic use-the commons was still large and bountiful in relation to
the scale of private efforts to occupy and possess it.97 The Roman
public trust was still intact.
The English law on this subject did not stay where Bracton
found it. On balance, the law moved back toward the Roman law
pronouncements that allowed less privatization. Two intercon-
nected points stand out. First, in working out the proper
compromise between public and private, the law became less rigid
by developing doctrines that allowed and supported a degree of
privatization in the foreshore area as long as the public rights were
not too greatly diminished.98 The law had changed from rigid pro-
hibition to more of an effects-based schema. Second, the law began
to embrace more explicitly a trust concept as an incident of sover-
eign ownership and obligation.99 The law began to impose trust-
based limitations as a servitude upon the ownership of those who
might become transferees or "permittees'9 ° of the sovereign in re-
lation to foreshore areas.
The law of the foreshore described by Bracton, to the extent
that it appeared to sanction privatization, did not remain the law of
England. Magna Carta of 1215 is one of the early turning points in
96. See Leonard R. Jaffee, Note, State Citizen Rights Respecting Greatiwater Resource Alloca-
tion: From Rome to NewJersey, 25 RUTGERS L. REv. 571, 579-80 (1971).
97. There is a paucity of direct data on this point. However, data on over-fishing and
environmental degradation and their impact on fish stocks are available, tracing trends at
least 200 years old. See, e.g., PAUL HOLM, OCEANS PAST: HISTORY MEETS MARINE SCIENCE
(2005), http://www.cmrh.dk/HMAP/OceansPastIntroHolm.pdf. The comparatively robust
state of fish stocks as an historic matter as little as 150 years ago would seem to imply that
they were not stressed a millennium before that.
98. See infra notes 101-111.
99. Id.
100. Michael C. Blumm & Lucus Ritchie, The Pioneer Spirit and the Public Trust: The Ameri-
can Rule of Capture and State Ownership of Wildlife, 35 Envtl. L. 673, 679 ("Concerning animals
ferae naturae, the king employed his sovereign and proprietary powers to diminish his sub-
jects' right to take wildlife by creating an elaborate land-classification system, including royal
forests, and by limiting hunting to royal grantees."). The crown often granted revocable
exclusive licenses called "liberties" to lords and sub-lords. Frequently these were for fast land
areas, such as forests for hunting, but some were for exclusive fisheries (liberties of piscary).
See Charles E. Clark, Licenses in Real Property Law, 21 COLUM. L. REv. 757, 761 (1921); see also
Alan Harding, Medieval Law and the Foundations of the State, 212-13 (2002); Royal E.T. Riggs,
The Alienability of the State's Title to the Foreshore, 12 COLUM. L. REv. 395,404 (1912).
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the effort to resurrect public trust uses, particularly in regard to
fisheries. Magna Carta expressly limited the practice of allowing
private parties to erect and maintain "kydells" (a kind of fish wheel
or fish weir) in some of the most important public waters, includ-
ing by name the rivers Thames and Medway and referring to other
inland waters "throughout all England."'0 ' Gradually, this public
pressure emerged as a counterweight to privatization of the shore
area. Public rights began to find their way into royal charters and
caselaw.0 2 By the time of the publication of Sir Matthew Hale's De
Jure Marisu' 3 five hundred years after Bracton, a distinctively new
balance was in place, and this balance was highly protective of pub-
lic usufructs. Crown ownership extended only to average high tide
rather than the extreme high tide of the Roman law. 0 4 Private
grants for fish weirs, piers, and docks below even that point had at
times been recognized 0 5 Vitally, piers and docks played an impor-
tant economic role in the life of England, an island nation heavily
engaged in trade, and were too important to be routinely subject
to abatement. Yet, at the same time private claims were being
eroded and cut back by a now-accepted "Digges" presumption
against such grants0 6 and public usufructs were in the process of
being reinvigorated by asserting that transfers below high-water
mark were impressed with a trust. For example, an important 1795
case involving Portsmouth harbor stated, "It is clear that the right
to the soil, between high and low water-mark, is prima facie in the
crown. Then the onus of proving an adverse title is thrown upon
the defendants [in an abatement action brought by the Crown] .
Several commentators point out that the Digges' theory had lit-
tle support when it was propounded, and that Hale's apparent
acceptance of that theory was not well grounded in the holdings of
101. Magna Carta, 1215, c. 33. Interestingly, Helen Althaus argues that this passage in
Magna Carta should be read to apply a public rights navigability doctrine to all waters, not
merely tidal waters. ALTHAUS, supra note 56, at 29. Such an extension of public rights un-
dermines those, such as Justice Markman, who criticize the application of English public
trust doctrines to non-tidal waters. See Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.w.2d 58, 92-93 (Mich. 2005)
(Markman,J., dissenting).
102. See generally ALTHAUS, supra note 56, at 23-38; Note, The Public Trust in Tidal Areas:
A Sometime Submerged Traditional Doctrine, supra note 63, at 764-66.
103. Matthew Hale, De Jure Maris, in A HISTORY OF THE FoRESHoRE 370 (Stuart A.
Moore ed., 3d ed. 1993) (1888).
104. See Attorney Gen. v. Chambers, 43 Eng. Rep. 486, 490 (1854) (relying on Hale's
treatise placing the demarcation line in English law at the medium high tide line).
105. Althaus, supra note 56 at 23-24.
106. See generally ALTHAUS, supra note 56, at 30-33.
107. Attorney Gen. v. Richards, 145 Eng. Rep. 980, 983 (1795).
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cases and was not as broad as has been argued.08 Even if these cri-
tiques of Digges are apt in pointing out its lack of support in
English law of his time, the critiques are immaterial in assessing the
role that the Digges' presumption plays in American law as pro-
pounded by American courts. It was Hale's treatise and the other
English sources of legal authority as understood by the American
courtso, and commentators"0 that formed the basis for establishing
American law on the subject."' As a result, their enunciations of
broad public ownership of the foreshore, supported both by a pre-
sumption against grants of those lands and an imposition of trust
on the holders of those lands, was the undisputed starting place for
American jurisprudence."2 Interestingly, as recounted below, in the
comparatively pragmatic political and social environment of the
emerging American nation, the public protections emerged even
more strongly, ensuring that the great waters would be a source of
great common benefit to the populous.
II. THE UNITED STATES HISTORY OF THE LAW OF THE
FORESHORE AND RIPARIAN BOUNDARIES
To fully understand the current United States law of the great
waters and the foreshore area, it is important to trace the reception
and adaptation of English law during the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries. This period saw overwhelming changes in the
United States: the opening and settlement of the West, industriali-
zation, a manifold growth in the population and the economy, and
the establishment of a well-defined federal system. This period also
placed a great deal of faith in laissez-faire economics, undergirded
108. See, e.g., Patrick Deveney, Title, Jus Publicum, and the Public Trust: An Historical
Analysis, 1 SEA GRANT L.J. 13 (1976); GlennJ. MacGrady, The Navigability Concept in the Civil
and Common Law, 3 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 511 (1975); see also Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.)
212, 231-32 (1845) (Catron,J., dissenting).
109. See, e.g., Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842).
110. See, e.g.,JOSEPH K. ANGELL, A TREATISE ON THE RIGHT OF PROPERTY IN TIDE WA-
TERS, AND IN THE SOIL AND SHORES THEREOF 38-39,50-51 (1826).
111. The possible fact that the Digges' presumption was not well-supported by the Eng-
lish law when it was propounded does not vitiate the ideas that it embodied in relation to
limits on sovereign authority. Particularly in another jurisdiction, in this case the United
States, the policy of the position could be credited and adopted even if the historical prece-
dential support in England was not substantial. Thus, the American courts were free to take
away from Hale the notion of trust ownership and public rights, and a stewardship concept
that attached to sovereign ownership of those key resources.
112. See infta text accompanying notes 117-147.
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by a strong conception of private property rights. 113 While it has
roots in the inherited English law, the public trust doctrine and its
companion boundary-adjusting doctrines (e.g. accretion) comprise
a uniquely American approach to rights of use in the foreshore. It
is plain that in the United States: (1) public rights in the foreshore
and public use of the foreshore are present and are protected to a
very large measure against alienation into exclusive private use; (2)
those rights encompass the whole body of rights available under
the English public trust doctrine: navigation, fishing, bathing, and
the use of the foreshore to effectuate those uses, including passage
along the shore; and (3) the public rights attach to waters and
shores along major navigable waterways, not just waters affected by
tidal flows." 4 States, although often denominated "masters of their
property law," are not wholly unfettered when they attempt to
modify the content of those public rights.15 Finally, boundary ad-
justing doctrines such as accretion and reliction, while preserving
riparian locational advantage, do not alter the basic relationship of
public and private rights."
6
A. Receiving English Common Law and Establishing
Public Rights Doctrines in America
It was not a foregone conclusion that the evolved public trust
norms of English common law, e.g., presumed sovereign owner-
ship and public use of public trust resources of the sea and
foreshore, would emigrate and survive in the new world that con-
fronted the colonists. The colonizers were risk takers and part of
the risk-reward bargain frequently included the express grant of
foreshore areas or the implied authority to privatize them as a
means of encouraging activities that served the Crown's interest in
having the colonies develop." 7 The success of the American Revo-
lution and the transfer of sovereignty from the Crown to the new
states created a decision point for the incipient American govern-
113. See, e.g., ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH
OF NATIONS (R.H. Campbell et al. eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1976) (1776). Laissez-faire is de-
scribed by Encyclopedia Brittanica Concise as "[w]idely accepted in the 19th century .... "
Britannica Concise, Laissez-Faire, http://concise.britannica.com/ebc/article-9369632/
laissez-faire (last visited Feb. 27, 2007).
114. See infra notes 117-174.
115. See infra notes 107-128.
116. See infra notes 177-188.
117. The Avalon Project, His Royal Highness's Grant to the Lords Proprietors, Sir
George Carteret, 29thJuly, 1674, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/states/nj04.htm.
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ments. It required them to choose between a legal posture that was
receptive to the past privatizations and upon which there was some
continuing reliance, and a legal posture that repudiated or limited
those colonial grants."" Although the latter course was likely to up-
set usages that had been in place for substantial periods of time in
reliance on royal and colonial grants, the politics of the issue were
rather one-sided. The new sovereigns' self-interest lay in restoring
to the state and the public the resources previously claimed and
alienated by the Crown. 9 Additionally, the holders of the royal
grants, in many cases, had been loyalists allied with or sympathetic
to the British during the Revolutionary War.120 It was a popular pol-
icy to undermine their economic base and redistribute the wealth
born of their royal privilege and favor.
21
The American resolution of this issue was first articulated in Ar-
nold v. Mundy, when the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that pre-
revolutionary private grants for oystering were invalid.2 2 In Martin
v. Waddell,123 the United States Supreme Court deliberated on facts
bearing a close resemblance to those in Arnold.124 The two cases
presented the same issue of exclusive oystering, on the same wa-
ters-Raritan Bay-again with a plaintiff claiming an exclusive
right of use derived directly from the same royal grant.12 5 That
grant was a 1664 royal grant from King Charles II to his brother
James, Duke of York, transferring a very considerable part of the
east coast of the United States.' 26 The most significant difference in
the two cases was that the federal trial court in Martin approved
and entered judgment on a jury verdict that had, unlike the New
Jersey Supreme Court in Arnold, held in favor of exclusive rights of
118. See, e.g., Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842).
119. See, e.g., id. (denying the plaintifFs exclusive right to take oysters in the public riv-
ers and bays pursuant to a grant by the King of Great Britain, arguing that right to fishery
cannot be privatized under English common law); see also, e.g., Russell v. The Jersey Co., 56
U.S. 426 (1853); Holyoke Co. v. Lyman, 82 U.S. 500 (1872).
120. See generally STEPHEN LYON MERSHON, ENGLISH CROWN GRANTS: THE FOUNDATION
OF COLONIAL LAND TITLES UNDER ENGLISH COMMON LAW 163 (1918).
121. The popularity of the policy in an economically stratified and bottom-weighted so-
ciety is an important reason for the inclusion of the "Takings" clause in the Bill of Rights. See
Jennifer Nedelsky, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM
(1990).
122. Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L.1 (1821).
123. Id.
124. Compare Martin v. Waddell 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842) (discussing exclusive royal
grant for oystering in Raritan Bay), with Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1 (1821) (discussing ex-
clusive royal grant for oystering in Raritan Bay).
125. Martin, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367; Arnold, 6 N.J.L. 1.
126. Martin, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 407.
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the eventual holder of the relevant portion of the area described in
the royal patent and against uses permitted by an 1824 New Jersey
statute. 127
The United States Supreme Court disagreed with the federal
trial court and embraced the Arnold result and important parts of
its reasoning.28 Because Martin involved competing grants of
oystering rights, the Court noted a sharp distinction between a
grant like that of King Charles to James and a grant of a small par-
cel.12a The Court stated that the grant from King Charles was an
instrument of so broad a scope that it was intended for founding a
"political community" and must be viewed in that light.1 30 That
light was harsh and demanding. It was premised on the position of
Hale in Dejure Maris, which was hostile to exclusive grants of fish-
ing rights and doubted whether, in a post-Magna Carta world, the
King could even make a grant of the magnitude of the one upon
which the claims in Martin were founded.'"' That position echoed a
vital passage of Chief Justice Kirkpatrick's opinion for the New Jer-
sey Supreme Court in Arnold v. Mundy, where the NewJersey Court
had said:
[B]y all these [the law of nature, the civil law, and the com-
mon law], the navigable rivers in which the tide ebbs and
flows, the ports, the bays, the coasts of the sea, including both
the water and the land under the water, for the purpose of
passing and repassing, navigation, fishing, fowling, suste-
nance, and all other uses of the water and its products (a few
things excepted) are common to all the citizens, and that
each has a right to use them according to his necessities, sub-
ject only to the laws which regulate that use; that the property,
indeed, strictly speaking, is vested in the sovereign, but it is
127. Id. at 407-08, 417-18.
128. Id. at 417-18. The Court does not rely on Arnold as precedent, but reaches the
same result and parallels some of its key arguments. See infra notes 131-136.
129. Martin described the Charter from the English monarch as follows: "It was an in-
strument upon which was to be founded the institutions of a great political community; and
in that light it should be regarded and construed." Martin, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 412. The
competing title was for only one hundred acres and was predicated upon an 1822 New Jer-
sey statute. Id. at 408.
130. Martin, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 411-12.
131. Id. at 412. Hale was also relied upon for the interpretation of the grant as reserving
the usual prerogatives of the Crown, even in the absence of any words of such reservation.
Id. at 416.
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vested in him not for his own use, but for the use of the citi-
zen, that is, for his direct and immediate enjoyment.'
A pivotal element in the reasoning of Justice Kirkpatrick was his
view of Magna Carta as restoring the common rights of the public
at large that had been established by the Roman, civil law, and
common law traditions.3 3 He characterized Magna Carta as no
more than, "a restoration of common right" that "restored again
the principles of the common law" after which "no king of England
has had the power of granting away these common rights ....
In Martin v. Waddell, the United States Supreme Court followed
suit.3 5 For grants of that nature, the Court established the view of
Sir Matthew Hale, incorporating the equivalent of the "Digges pre-
sumption," as part of American property law, protecting all public
trust resources for the public's use and benefit:
The dominion and property in navigable waters, and in the
lands under them, being held by the king as a public trust, the
grant to an individual of an exclusive fishery in any portion of
it, is so much taken from the common fund intrusted to his
care for the common benefit. In such cases, whatever does not
pass by the grant, still remains in the crown for the benefit
and advantage of the whole community. Grants of that de-
scription are therefore construed strictly-and it will not be
presumed that he intended to part from any portion of the
public domain, unless clear and especial words are used to
denote it.
3 6
Unequivocal words of grant that made no mention of extin-
guishing trust rights, were insufficient to free the lands from
the trust.'37
A few years after that, in 1845, the Supreme Court addressed a
related question of trust-based limitations on tidelands grants-this
132. Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 76-77 (1821).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Martin, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 411.
136. Id.
137. See id. at 369-74 (containing the language of the grant).
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one having a complicated overlay of federalism. In Pollard v.
Hagan, the area under consideration involved lands in Alabama.
138
According to the fact finding in the case, the area involved was fast
land that previously had lain under the waters of Mobile River in a
tidal area.139 The plaintiffs in a quiet title action claimed under a
post-statehood grant from the United States; the defendants
claimed as state law riparians owners of the upland parcel asserting
that the land that had emerged was theirs due to the operation of
the accretion doctrine.
40
The case was complicated because of the many possibilities re-
garding the source of title for the parcel.41 The Court accepted the
fact-finding showing that the parcel was submerged at Alabama's
statehood, and found that it was inalienable by the United States,
which had held title as a trustee for the later created states, such as
Alabama.142 The majority concluded by describing the uniquely
American position on these matters, spelling out that the states,
both original and new, became the successor "municipal sover-
eigns" to the English crown or other sovereigns who made grants
to the United States. 4 3 A key precept in the opinion was the clear
enunciation of the equal footing doctrine that placed the later
formed states on an equal plane with the original states. The court
put it plainly when it stated, "The new states have the same rights,
sovereignty, and jurisdiction over this subject as the original
states."14
The Pollard opinion granted an apparent hegemony to the states
over tidelands, a key public trust resource."4 5 The majority simulta-
neously reminded the states of the uniquely American public trust
ownership by the states to ensure the benefits of common use, stat-
ing, "[b]ut her rights of sovereignty and jurisdiction are not
138. Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845).
139. See id. at 219-20.
140. Id.
141. The complexities included efforts to link the parcel's title to the deed of cession by
the State of Georgia of its western claims in 1802, to the Louisiana Purchase, to the Treaty
with Spain of 1819, to the Property Clause found in Article IV of the United States Constitu-
tion, and to the common law of England. See id. at 221-29. These concerns were relevant
because of their potential to affect the rights of Alabama which was, by express words, admit-
ted to the Union on an "equal footing" with the original states. Id. at 222.
142. Seeid. at 221.
143. Id. at 228-30. The term "municipal sovereignty" is used throughout Justice
McKinley's opinion, and is aimed at explaining the limits of federal power under the Prop-
erty Clause and is not a limitation on the enumerated powers of the United States. See id.
(discussing commerce power regulation).
144. Id. at 230.
145. Id.
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governed by the common law of England as it prevailed in the
colonies before the Revolution, but as modified by our own institu-
tions. 14 As discussed more fully later, whatever English courts may
have deemed appropriate for the Crown to do in relation to public
trust properties in England, the law in the United States would be
the law of its own making, and that law severely limited govern-
ment's power to alienate trust properties, and by implication, the
power to extinguish uses at the heart of the public trust.
47
B. Adapting English Public Rights to the American Topography
In the early years of nationhood, American courts received the
English law of the foreshore and riparian boundaries, modified its
public rights content, and immediately began to adapt it instru-
mentally to meet the country's needs.148 Conditions in the United
States, both physical and economic, were different from those in
England. The newly formed nation, in the main, lacked the accu-
mulated wealth needed for capital formation and had little by way
of industrial infrastructure. Instead, it had a wealth of natural re-
sources. England, in contrast, was a relatively small island nation
where conditions tended to be the opposite. Partly because of their
respective circumstances, both nations were dependent on trade,
and in that era, the bulk of trade moved most easily by water. Ac-
cordingly, navigation was a paramount concern on a practical level
and the laws of both nations employed doctrines that reflected the
importance of navigation along the waterways that would bear it.'49
In the United States, this fact led to wholesale acceptance of public
rights in the great waters and unique refinements of received Eng-
lish doctrine to ensure that the public benefits were available even
on waters that would not have been the subject of public rights in
England.
In England, the great waters to which public rights doctrines at-
tached-the presumption of Crown ownership and the public
trust-were waters affected by the tides.15 0 In England, waters
146. Id. at 229.
147. See infra notes 148-174.
148. See, e.g., Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation in the Conception of Property in Ameri-
can Law, 1780-1860, 40 U. CHI. L. REv. 248 (1973); cf SAX ET AL., supra note 15, at 37-47
(describing the instrumentalist development of the law of riparian rights in the early years of
nationhood).
149. See SAX ET AL., supra note 15, at 522-24.
150. Id.
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subject to tidal influence corresponded well to the waters that had
value for navigation and trade. 15' The same was not true in the
United States. Roads into the American interior were few and poor,
but unlike England, the United States had many major rivers that
were navigable well above the tidal influence. 52 Likewise, after the
Treaty of 1783 with Great Britain and the Louisiana Purchase in
1803, the United States owned vast unsettled areas drained by great
non-tidal rivers and, of course, the Great Lakes.'53 Recognizing the
necessity of shaping the law to take advantage of the network of
interior great waters, United States courts developed doctrines of
navigability that did not depend on tidal influence and attached
the English public rights promoting doctrines of public ownership
and the public trust to the larger class of waters that extended be-
yond the reach of tidal influence.5 4 The rationale for rejecting the
English view was simple-it did not suit America, and American
courts believed that had English topographical conditions been
similar to those in the United States, the English common law rule
would itself have been different:
This [English] common law right [limiting public rights to
tidal waters], if even it was properly applicable to the Susque-
hanna and Delaware, and other large waters, was not deemed
proper for this country, nor was it adopted, up to the period
of our revolution; because the several acts of assembly before
that time, declaring these rivers to be highways, and regulat-
ing the fisheries in them, are incompatible with the [English]
common law right; and since the revolution, no part of the
common law has been adopted except that which was proper
for our country.155
The somewhat more subtle question was whether the only rights
that advanced beyond the ebb and flow of the tide were naviga-
tional in nature, or whether the full panoply of public trust
rights-navigation, fishing, and bathing, along with foreshore ac-
cess and use-followed the expanded navigability doctrines of the
151. See generally William Drayton, Note, The Public Trust in Tidal Areas: A Sometime Sub-
merged Traditional Doctrine, 79 Yale L.J. 762 (1970).
152. See infra notes 155-157.
153. See Treaty for the Cession of Louisiana, U.S.-Fr., Apr. 30, 1803, 8 Stat. 200 (ceding
Louisiana).
154. This is familiar material to students of water law, particularly in regard to the use of
navigability doctrines to ensure public usufructs. See, e.g., SAX ET AL., supra note 15, at 521-
33.
155. Carson v. Blazer, 2 Binn. 474, 476 (Pa. 1810).
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emerging American nation. Of course, the great waters of the
United States are all navigationally valuable and many cases ex-
panding public rights beyond the English tidal reach relied on
navigability as the focus of their pragmatic rationale. 56 For exam-
ple, some states, such as Maine, established a public right of
navigation in non-tidal rivers.5 7 Other states, even in the context of
rivers, went beyond navigation. For example, Pennsylvania held an
exclusive private fishery violative of public rights on a major non-
tidal river.5 8 As a general matter, on inland navigable waters other
than the Great Lakes, the English common law, as accepted by many
American states, granted limited use of the shore to the public,
usually the right to tie up to trees and other objects-a use plainly
associated with the navigational use of the waters.
159
For present purposes, however, the most important develop-
ments were those affecting the Great Lakes, which were recognized
by the Supreme Court as "inland seas" as to which title of the states
and grants to any private riparians were all subject to the public
trust. 16 For the Great Lakes, the United States Supreme Court ex-
plained that the same logic that had extended admiralty
jurisdiction in the United States to inland non-tidal waters also
156. Id. The opinion explains that the English principle was not well-suited to America's
inland waters that were navigable well above the reach of tidal influence. The court notes
that the Susquehanna, for example, "is a mile wide, and runs several hundred miles through
a rich country, and ... is navigable, and is actually navigated by large boats." Id. The court
then stated its view that had a river with those qualities been found in England, it would
have prompted the English to adopt a different rule of navigability and public use. Id. The
court pointed out that in England, the only rivers in which the tide does not ebb and flow
"are small." Id.
157. See Brown v. Chadbourne, 31 Me. 9, 21-23 (1849).
158. See Carson, 2 Binn. at 476-77 (rejecting an exclusive fishery on the Susquehanna
River).
159. See, e.g., Morgan v. Reading, 11 Miss. (3 S. & M.) 366, 372-78 (1844) (citing, and
translating from Latin, English authorities from Bracton onward). In some jurisdictions this
use was limited to times of emergency. See, e.g., id. Rules of bed title also vary slightly, but, in
general, on rivers and lakes that were actually used for navigation at the time of admission of
the state to the union, the state owns the beds. See, e.g., Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9
(1971). Other ancillary uses of the fast land in aid of navigation were at times allowed. See,
e.g., Brown, 31 Me. at 24-25 (removal of riparian's dam to allow log floating permitted). For
all other waters the riparian owns to the thread of the stream, even if under state law the
public or co-riparians have a right of use of the water itself. See generally SAX ET AL., supra
note 15, at 521-33.
160. The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443,453 (1851).
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extended the public trust use of the sea and its shores to the Great
Lakes. 6'
The holding in Illinois Central, declaring the applicability of the
full public trust doctrine to the Great Lakes, rests on a number of
lines of authority. 62 Primary, of course, is the argument of Justice
Field that the public trust attaches to waters, viewed as important
to navigation and full public use. Like earlier American judges," '
he felt the English rule applying the trust to tidal waters was
adopted because that class of waters in England was coextensive
with the waters valuable for navigation and other public use.165
Hence, tidal influence was not a basis for limitation of the trust in
this country. Rather, to Justice Field, the English position's logic
supported an extension of the trust to other waters that shared the
suitability to provide the public benefits to which the English pub-
lic trust doctrine applied. 66 Second, by 1892, the Supreme Court
had many times elaborated what the equal footing doctrine meant.
In cases like Martin v. Waddell, the thrust of public trust as it both
benefited and burdened the later-formed states had become very
clear-the foreshore was trust property in the hands of the United
States, so the national government was not competent to impair
the trust and all states succeeded to the interest of the previous
foreign sovereign.67 Part of the holding in Illinois Central clearly
announced the burden on states: the foreshore was trust property,
not only while it was in the hands of the federal government in the
pre-statehood period, but also when it was in the hands of the
states after statehood.'8 This was always true, but had not been an
issue in any previous case. That explains why the Court cites no
grants of riparian tracts of comparable magnitude in its description
of the 1863 grant to Illinois Central. 69 That also may explain why
the Court went to some length in its description of the parcel
granted to Illinois Central and its importance to Chicago and the
161. Id. at 453-54; see also Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371 (1891). The language in Har-
din is especially telling on this point, describing the Great Lakes as "inland seas" subject to
the same rules as the ocean front. See id. at 382.
162. Arguments that support full application of the public trust to the Great Lakes have
moorings in the Northwest Ordinance and the Commerce Clause. See generally Wilkinson,
supra note 33.
163. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435-37 (1892).
164. See supra 122-147.
165. 111. Cent. RRK Co., 146 U.S. at 435-37.
166. Seesupra, notes 161-165.
167. See, e.g., Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842); see also Pollard v. Hagan,
44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845).
168. Il1. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 436-37 (1892).
169. Id. at 452-56.
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region, thereby conveying the Court's sense of the enormity of the
grant and its public consequence. 7 0 In that regard, Illinois Central
was a case of first impression because no state previously had at-
tempted to alienate a significant amount of public trust property
free of the trust. Vitally, while there were statements to the effect
that the states could determine which grants of trust lands to pri-• 171
vate individuals served the common benefit of the people, after
Illinois Central, it was clear that the state was itself a trustee and
was limited in making choices that would release parcels from the
trust. The state was not free to act in disregard of the common
benefit. Just two years later in Shively v. Bowlby, 72 a case the modem
Court has deemed "the seminal case in American public trust ju-
risprudence,' 73 the Court summarized the principles governing
lands between high and low water in major navigable waters as fol-
lows:
Lands under tide waters are incapable of cultivation or im-
provement in the manner of lands above high water mark.
They are of great value to the public for the purposes of
commerce, navigation and fishery. Their improvement by indi-
viduals, when permitted, is incidental or subordinate to the public use
and right. Therefore the title and the control of them are
vested in the sovereign for the benefit of the whole people.'7'
C. Public Trust Law in the Courts of the Great Lakes States
The highest courts of a number of Great Lakes states have an-
nounced ringing endorsements of the public trust as it applies to
the Great Lakes.7 1 What is equally clear, though not always
achieved by the same doctrinal path, is that the area to which the
public's trust-based rights attached includes the foreshore, to high
water. The only material doctrinal variation goes to title to the
lands, and to the precise way in which high water is described by
170. Id. at 454-55.
171. See, e.g., Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 46-47 (1894).
172. Shively, 152 U.S. at 1.
173. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 473 (1988).
174. Shively 152 U.S. at 57 (emphasis added).
175. See infra notes 176-205.
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the courts.'76 These variations do not affect core public usufructs.
What also comes through is solicitude for the riparian advantage of
proximity, but not at the expense of the public's rights.
The 1916 Ohio Supreme Court decision in State v. Cleveland &
Pittsburg RR Co.'7 is, perhaps, the best example of meshing public
trust protection with respect for the private interests of riparian
(littoral) proprietors. In that case, the federal government had
constructed a harbor on Lake Erie in Cleveland by putting in a
breakwater and dredging to ensure water of a navigable depth to a
harbor line at some distance landward inside the breakwater. 78 The
harbor line, however, was still a considerable distance, roughly 900
feet, from the high-water mark in many parts of the harbor.'79 The
legal conflict arose when the littoral owners, including among
them the Cleveland & Pittsburgh Railroad, claimed a common law
right to wharf out to the navigable water.' s° Because of the great
distance from their upland to the harbor line, they facilitated their
efforts at wharfing out by filling in some portion of the shallow wa-
ter closest to the shore.'8' The State of Ohio claimed title to the
shallows between the harbor line and the upland shore as absolute
owner to the high-water mark under the received English common
law. 8 In addition, it claimed that its ownership was superior to the
claimed riparian right to wharf out to navigable water under the
common law of England from which the state's property law de-
rived.
83
The Ohio Supreme Court began by explaining that American
courts' reception of English common law "does not compel us to
incorporate into our system of jurisprudence principles which are
inapplicable to our circumstances and which are inconsistent with
our notions of what a just consideration of those circumstances
demands.'8 4 Using that understanding of the received law, and
with an instrumental explanation of the necessity of wharfing out
176. Minnesota, for example, grants title to the low-water mark. See infra notes 205-208.
Defining the ordinary high-water mark was a matter that is frequently addressed in the cases.
See, e.g., Glass v. Goeckel, 473 Mich. 667, 685-94 (2005).
177. State v. Cleveland & Pittsburgh R.R. Co., 113 N.E. 677 (Ohio 1916).
178. Id. at 679. The harbor line would mark the point at which, on the lakeward side,
the water would be deep enough for navigation. On the landward side of the harbor line,
the water would, in many places, be too shallow to support navigation.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 677-79.
182. Id. at 679.
183. See id.
184. Id. at 681 (quoting Brookhaven v. Smith, 80 N.E. 665, 667 (N.Y. 1907) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
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to conducting commerce, the court found that in the United
States, most states had concluded that the littoral owner has the
right to wharf out to navigable waters, "provided he does not inter-
fere with the public rights of navigation or fishery .... 085
Additionally, the court explained "the state holds the title to the
subaqueous land of navigable waters as the trustee for the protec-
tion of the public rights therein."
1 6
The court turned the case into a win-win-win proposition for the
state, the riparian, and the federal government and a resounding
victory for the public trust doctrine. First, the court acknowledged
the state's regulatory authority over "navigation and fishing be-
tween [the harbor] line and the shore" as long as the state
regulation did not conflict with federal law in violation of the Su-
premacy clause. 87 Second, finding no state regulation was in place,
the court next vindicated the riparian right of the littoral owner to
"wharf out to the line of navigability," which was in this case the
harbor line fixed by the federal government. 88 The court ex-
plained that this right to reach navigable water maximized the
private benefit of the littoral location."88 The court, however, made
clear that the private usufruct was subordinate to the public right
in the land between the fast land and the navigable water:
Whatever [the littoral owner] does in that behalf is done with knowl-
edge on his part that the title to the subaqueous soil is held by the state
as trustee for the public, and that nothing can be done by him that
will destroy or weaken the rights of the beneficiaries of the trust estate.
His right must yield to the paramount right of the state as
such trustee to enact regulatory legislation. It must be re-
membered that his right, pending appropriate legislation, is
one that can be exercised only in aid of navigation and com-
merce, and for no other purpose. What he does is therefore
in furtherance of the object of the trust, and is permitted
solely on that account. 90
185. Cleveland &Pittsburgh R., 113 N.E. at 681. The case did not put in issue the ques-
tion of the exact line between state ownership and upland ownership (whether it was high
water or some other place) because the area under dispute was all subaqueous land to which
all agreed title was in the state. Id. at 681-82.
186. Id. at 681.
187. Id. at 682.
188. Id. This right of the landowner, however, could not interfere with navigation. See id.
189. Id. at 680-82.
190. Id. (emphasis added).
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Finally, the Ohio Supreme Court made it absolutely clear that
the state, by its inaction, could not change the power relationship
that allowed it to subordinate the interest of the private littoral
owner to the public good. The court stated, "[t] he state as trustee
for the public cannot, by acquiescence, abandon the trust property
or enable a diversion of it to private ends different from the object
for which the trust was created."' 9'
Other courts have been called upon to consider where the line
exists between property subject to the trust and property that is
free of the trust. As the following examples show, the states do vary
on title, but do not vary on the fact that the public's trust rights
attach up to high water, however described. 92 An early Illinois case,
Seaman v. Smith,9 3 first noted that on oceans and bays the rule was
that the upland owner held title only to the ordinary high-water
mark. 9 4 The case then described the equivalent point of demarca-
tion as it pertained to a parcel bounded by a non-tidal body, Lake
Michigan, as being "that place where its outer edge is usually
found."' 95 A more recent Illinois case traced the Illinois rule for
Lake Michigan back to Lord Hale and the Shively case, stating that,
"below ordinary high-water mark ... this title (jus privatum),
191. Id. The passage continues using trust law precepts even more explicitly, stating:
If it is once fully realized that the state is merely the custodian of the legal title,
charged with the specific duty of protecting the trust estate and regulating its use, a
clearer view can be had. An individual may abandon his private property, but a public
trustee cannot abandon public property. Mere nonuser of the trust property by the
public cannot authorize the appropriation of it by private persons to private uses, and
thus thwart the purposes of the trust.
Id.
192. Three Great Lakes states will not be discussed in the text. New York recognizes
state trust ownership to the ordinary high-water mark. See, e.g., People ex rel Burnham v.
Jones, 20 N.E. 577 (N.Y. 1889). But see Stewart v. Turney, 142 N.E. 437 (N.Y 1923) (finding
that riparian on an inland lake owns to low water; later relied upon by a lower court to apply
to Lake Ontario in Ransom v. Shaeffer, 274 NYS 570, 573 (Sup. Ct. 1934)). Indiana, which
has only 45 miles of Great Lakes shore, has no case on point but has adhered to the public
trust in a case involving the Ohio River. See Sherlock v. Bainbridge, 41 Ind. 352 (1872).
Pennsylvania, which has only 51 miles of Great Lakes shoreline, has held in favor of the
public trust to the high-water mark on navigable rivers even when the riparian title ran to
low water. See Freeland v. Pa. R.R. Co., 47 A. 745 (Pa. 1901). A lower court has applied that
decision to the Lake Erie shore. See Sprague v. Nelson, 6 Pa. D. & C. 493, 496 (1924); see also
supra note 155 (describing public trust in Pennsylvania's navigable rivers).
193. Seaman v. Smith, 24 111. 521 (1860).
194. Id. at 524-25.
195. Id. at 525, quoted with approval in People ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Kirk, 45 N.E. 830,
833 (Ill. 1896).
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whether in the sovereign or in the subject, is held subject to the
public right (jus publicum) of navigation and fishing."' 96
Wisconsin is similar in its reception of the public trust into its
law. The leading case explained the title of the United States in the
years before statehood as "in trust for public purposes.',9 7 Going
beyond that, the court described the effect on the trust of transfer
by the United States to the state by stating that "its trust in that re-
gard was transferred to the state, and must there continue forever,
so far as necessary to the enjoyment thereof by the people of this
commonwealth."' 98 The court further noted that the state could
make concessions in favor of riparian proprietors, but only conces-
sions that could be made "without violating the essentials of the
trust .... ,19
Michigan is no exception to the general rule that the state owns
the beds of the Great Lakes to the high-water mark. It, too, has rec-
ognized state trust ownership to the high tide line since the dawn
of the twentieth century.0 In People v. Silberwood, the Michigan Su-
preme Court observed that the rule of Illinois Central on the scope
and command of the public trust "is without flaw and ought to
stand as the law of this state."2 ' Five years later, in Lake St. Clair, a
case that pitted the state against riparians in a contest over a strip
of low-lying land that had been extensively developed by the litto-
ral owners, the state prevailed and the court firmly established the
high-water mark as the boundary of state ownership and authority:
"On the admission of Michigan, all of said submerged land covered
by this lake, to high water mark, passed to the state in its sovereign
196. Cobb v. Lincoln Park Comm'rs, 67 N.E. 5, 6 (Ill. 1903).
197. Ill. Steel Co. v. Bilot, 84 N.W. 855, 856 (Wis. 1901), quoted with approval in Muench
v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 53 N.W.2d 514, 517 (Wis. 1952); State v. Land Concepts, Ltd., 501
N.W.2d 817, 819 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993).
198. Ill. Steel, 84 N.W. at 856-57.
199. Id. at 857. The most recent case in this line is R. W. Docks & Slips v. State, 628
N.W.2d 781 (Wis. 2001). The court stated that the public trust right up to the high-water
mark "is established by judicial authority so long acquiesced in as to become a rule of prop-
erty." Id. at 788 (citing Franzini v. Layland, 97 N.W. 499 (Wis. 1903) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
200. See, e.g., State v. Lake St. Clair Fishing & Shooting Club, 87 N.W. 117 (Mich. 1901).
The Glass majority itself does not rely on arguments that demarcate title, instead noting that
the jus publicum runs to the ordinary high-water mark. Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58, 69-
71 (Mich. 2005).
201. People v. Silberwood, 67 N.W. 1087, 1089 (Mich. 1896).
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right,-not as private proprietor, and subject to sale, but in trust
for the public .... "
Minnesota is the one state that has expressly granted littoral title
to the low-water mark on the Great Lakes (i.e., on Lake Superior,
the only Great Lake it touches). Noting that the choice is a matter
of state-by-state prerogative and that Minnesota extended riparian
titles to the low-water mark, the court in State v. Korrer stated,
" [w] hile the title of a riparian owner in navigable or public waters
extends to ordinary low-water mark, his title is not absolute except
to ordinary high-water mark."20 3 The title to the foreshore, the area
between high and low water is described as "limited or qualified by
the right of the public to use the same for purpose of navigation or
other public purpose."2 4 The state retains an on-going servitude
that allows the state to override "without compensation" uses of the
riparian "that would interfere with its present or prospective public
use .... ,,205 Thus, even while Minnesota allows title to pass to the
littoral owners abutting Lake Superior all the way to the low-water
mark, this title is nonetheless burdened by a paramount servitude
that applies the public trust to the area below ordinary high water.
The Minnesota example is quite helpful in relation to judicial
opinions that find, in one phrasing or another, that each state is
free to formulate its own public trust law. Minnesota, by granting
private title to the foreshore subject to a paramount public usu-
fruct, established a unique property law/public trust law for its
foreshore without abandoning the core principles of the public
trust doctrine. Plainly, from a public trust perspective, it is not a
denial of the trust for the upland owner to own down to low water
as long as the trust remains intact to high water. Formulating local-
ized public trust law is not the same as being able to disregard the
trust altogether.
D. Riparian Boundary Law in the United States
The earlier foray into the law of riparian boundaries demon-
strates that legal systems in the Western tradition, including those
from which American jurisprudence is derived, have employed
202. Lake St. Clair, 87 N.W. at 125. The passage continued by ruling that adverse posses-
sion claims against the state do not operate in regard to lands below the ordinary high-water
mark. Id.
203. State v. Korrer, 148 N.W. 617, 623 (Minn. 1914).
204. Id.
205. Id.
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adaptive doctrines to account for the natural variability of the
shoreline for, quite literally, eons.20 6 Accretion, reliction, erosion,
and submergence operate in tandem to maintain the riparian
character of riparian parcels by allowing alteration of the water-
ward parcel boundary in response to gradual permanent physical
changes in the shoreline. There is little, if anything, about the four
doctrines that is controversial at a policy level. These doctrines
marry the physical realities of natural forces operating at the edge
of water bodies to the almost tautological principle that riparian
parcels are, and ought to remain, parcels that touch the water.
Correlatively, that water, wherever it is located, ought to be treated
as water in regard to the uses to be made. This arrangement pre-
serves the distinctive nature of riparian parcels that derives from
proximity to the water, such as the right to wharf out to establish
ingress and egress to deeper water.0 7 The doctrines also work to
ensure that no intervening fast lands can become the exclusive
property of a competing owner.2 0 s This arrangement, likewise,
means that the uses of the water for navigation, fishing, and bath-
ing, are permitted on all areas of the water, whether reduced in
size, or expanded in size. The "boundary line" adjustment also
means that the instrumental use of the foreshore by the public to
effectuate the key public trust uses of the water are unimpaired
and continue in the area above low water and below high water.
On the great waterways, such as the Great Lakes with which this
Article is most concerned, the underlying ownership of subaque-
ous beds is firmly established in several states.00 Likewise, as
demonstrated in the preceding section, public ownership or a
dominant servitude effectuate public usufructs in the foreshore
area above low water up to the ordinary high-water mark. With the
relative rights and areas to which they attach well-formulated, the
need to adjust boundaries is self-evident and vitally important.
Simply imagine what would occur if the law did not allow the
206. See supra notes 70-73.
207. The incidents of riparianism comprise a far longer list, but the focus here is on
parcels that are riparian to great waters, where many of the typical riparian privileges that
attach to smaller bodies of water are not only available to riparians, but to the general public
as well and, therefore, do not need to be supported by ownership of riparian land.
208. This was the problem that the Michigan Supreme Court rectified in Hilt v. Weber.
Hilt v. Weber, 233 N.W. 159, 167-68 (Mich. 1930). That case, however, included as dicta a
careless statement taken from an inland lakes case describing ownership of the riparian as
running to the water's edge. See supra text accompanying notes 14-16.
209. See supra text accompanying notes 117-147.
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boundaries that define the respective rights of the states and the
upland owners to be modified as gradual changes took place.
Consider first the case in which the land grows, whether by the
gradual deposition of additional materials-accretion 2°--or by a
gradual recession of the water-reliction.211 If the law of bounda-
ries is fixed, the land that is added or that emerges as the water
recedes is land that was under the water before. If the boundary
does not change, that land was owned by the state while it was cov-
ered with water and, because the boundary would not move
without the modifying doctrine, remains in state ownership now
that it is fast land. Moreover, since the result of the physical accre-
tion or reliction has transformed that area into fast land (i.e.,
above the ordinary high-water mark), that ownership by the state is
ownership of the areas to which the public trust no longer at-
taches. If the land is not trust property, the land can be used by the
state for its own purposes or alienated into full private ownership.
Stated slightly differently, absent boundary adjustment, the state
would now be the riparian and the former riparian would have lost
all the benefits of the parcel's riparian status. The moveable
boundary2 12 supported by the doctrines of accretion and reliction
maintains the status quo ante of relative rights. Although the point
of demarcation is in a different physical location on the map, all of
the legal relationships-private upland fee ownership, public bed
ownership, riparian privileges and usufructs that differ from those
of the general public, and public servitudes and usufructs-remain
the same.
Conversely, in cases in which the land shrinks, whether by the
gradual removal of materials-erosion 21 3 -or by a gradual increase
210. Accretion is defined as: "1. The gradual accumulation of land by natural forces,
esp. as alluvium is added to land situated on the bank of a river or on the seashore." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 22 (8th ed. 2004).
211. Reliction is defined as: "1. A process by which a river or stream shifts its location,
causing the recession of water from its bank .... 2. The alteration of a boundary line be-
cause of the gradual removal of land by a river or stream." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1317
(8th ed. 2004). A previous edition of Black's Law Dictionary provides a better definition:
"An increase of the land by the permanent withdrawal or retrocession of the sea or a river.
Process of gradual exposure of land by permanent recession of body of water." BLACK's LAw
DICTIONARY 1161 (5th ed. 1979).
212. Some cases use the phrase "moveable freehold." See, e.g., Glass v. Goeckel, 683
N.W.2d 719, 726 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004) (quoting Peterman v. State Dep't of Natural Res.,
521 N.W.2d 499,507 (Mich. 1994)).
213. Erosion is defined as: "The wearing away of something by action of the elements;
esp., the gradual eating away of soil by the operation of currents or tides." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 582 (8th ed. 2004).
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~~214 .in the level of the water-submergence -the boundary would
need to be adjusted in the reverse direction. If that did not occur,
the riparian would now be able to claim ownership of a strip of wa-
ter-covered land as subject to exclusive ownership and could forbid
or charge the public for access to that area which is essential to en-
joyment of the water as a whole. To prevent this result, under the
doctrines of erosion and submergence, the riparian's fee shrinks,
the public's beds increase in size, and the relative rights of each
near the water's edge, albeit in a different location, remain the
same.
Despite the analytical symmetry of the four doctrines, strong in-
centives to litigate accretion and reliction cases contrast with
correspondingly weak incentives to litigate over erosion and sub-
mergence. This imbalance results from the fact that accretion and
reliction make practical as well as legal differences in the focused
private interest of the affected riparian in remaining riparian,
while erosion and submergence most often affect only diffused
benefits belonging to the general public that, in most cases, are not
being threatened with disruption in the real world because the ri-
parian that might be able to claim a trespass is making no effort to
exclude the public from the now inundated areas and shores. The
passive attitude of the riparians who have "lost" land to erosion or
submergence is understandable-the parcel has remained riparian
and the area that has eroded away has lost all practical value as a
situs for the uses made on fast land. This explains why there ap-
pears to be a total dearth of erosion or submersion cases when the
adversely affected riparian is arguing only to have the boundary
left unchanged in order to better utilize the now-submerged or
215foreshore areas. Instead, erosion and submergence cases and
214. The term "submergence" does not appear in the law dictionaries, but is used in
several cases and is linked to reliction in the same way that erosion is linked to accretion. See
e.g., Michelsen v. Leskowicz, 55 N.Y.S.2d 831, 838 (1945) ("[T]he proprietorship of lands
may be lost by erosion or submergence, the former consisting of a gradual eating away of
the soil by the operation of current or tides, and the other of its disappearance under the
water and the formation of a more or less navigable body over it."). There is a linguistic
anomaly here, de-reliction (or dereliction) (the relevant meaning, of course) should be the
opposite of "reliction." That is not the case, the two are synonyms; Black's Law Dictionary
defines "dereliction" as "2. An increase of land caused by the receding of a sea, river, or
stream from its usual watermark." BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 475 (8th ed. 2004).
215. It appears that in cases where the facts give any hope of it, the riparian attempts to
argue for avulsion as the basis for leaving the boundary unchanged rather than making the
attack on the "ordinary" operation of the boundary changing effect of erosion and submer-
gence with regard to minerals in the soil. See, e.g., Mun. Liquidators, Inc. v. Tench, 153 So.
2d 728 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
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subaqueous boundary cases more generally are contested primarily
when the changed boundary would place valuable mineral or oil
and gas deposits present in the depths of the soil on the other side
of the former boundary2 1 6 The few courts that have addressed this
question in regard to claims of the eroded landowner to retain the
minerals that were previously part of the parcel have not separated
217the surface and subsurface estates and have stressed the impor-
tance of retaining the correlative advantages to the respective
parties of access to the waterbody.
211
Returning to the questions germane to public rights in the great
waters, this discussion of accretion, reliction, erosion, and submer-
gence has demonstrated quite clearly that those boundary
adjustment devices do not intend to alter the division between pri-
vate and public interests in the great waters or their foreshore.
Having looked at both the erosion and submergence cases and the
arguments made for upland owners' rights and the courts' grounds
for rejection of those claims, it is clear that there is nothing in
those cases that undercuts the balance of private and public rights
established by the larger law of the foreshore. To the contrary, even
commentary critical of the mobile boundary as applied to the min-
eral estate accepts and favors the mobile boundary concept in
relation to surface interests which is the aspect of the doctrine that
protects public interests in access and use of the foreshore.
BEYOND GLASS V GOECKEL: CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS
FOR FURTHER ANSWERS
The Michigan Supreme Court ruling in Glass v. Goeckel is a rich
decision that is imbued with the great legal tradition recognizing
and protecting public rights. The majority opinion self-consciously
asserts the public trust to protect public interests in the foreshore
216. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 (1988). Cf Louisiana v.
Mississippi, 466 U.S. 96 (1984) (dispute over boundary location on interstate river precipi-
tated by presence of oil and gas deposits beneath channel). For a discussion of accretion
and erosion disputes, see supra text accompanying notes 210-215.
217. See, e.g.,Jackson v. Burlington N. Inc., 667 P.2d 406 (Mont. 1983) (oil deposits un-
der Yellowstone River); Nilsen v. Tenneco Oil Co., 614 P.2d 36 (Okla. 1980) (oil beneath a
non-navigable river).
218. See Robert L. Kimball, Comment, Accretion and Severed Mineral Estates, 53 U. CHI. L.
REv. 232, 241-42 (1986). Mr. Kimball lists four lines of argument employed by the courts. Id.
at 241-51. Although Mr. Kimball is quite critical of applying the movable boundary indis-
criminately to the severed mineral estates, Kimball does not object to moveable boundary
for the surface estate in accretion and erosion cases. Id. at 241.
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against radical diminution and loss. ' 9 The victory for public rights,
however, does not signal the end of the challenges. The private
property side, possessed of a considerable war chest, unsuccessfully
sought both rehearing in the Michigan Supreme Court2 20 and cer-
tiorari in the United States Supreme Court.22 In Ohio, efforts to
restrict public use of the foreshore in that state persist. Those ef-
forts demonstrate that the public trust issue, even as settled
doctrine, is unlikely ever to be free from renewed efforts by self-
interested property owners to capture and privatize a greater share
of the resource benefits surrounding the great waters of this na-
tion. For that reason, reciting why the Glass v. Goeckel majority has
propounded a correct view of the law is a way station, but not the
endpoint of the larger discussion of public trust.
The most important work that remains is to take Glass v. Goeckel
to what might be called the Illinois Central level, and then two half
steps beyond. In Illinois Central, of course, the most distinctive as-
pect of the case lay in the decision that some set of actions by the
sovereign in derogation of the public trust were impermissible, il-
legal, and, therefore, void.2 In Glass, the Michigan Supreme Court
needed only to find that the court of appeals' interpretation of the
Michigan law was incorrect and reversal followed from that. 23 The
case was still what might be called a run-of-the-mill appeal that cor-
rected an error below, without any of the gravitas that was required
to define the authority of a sovereign state to limit public trust
rights. To a significant extent, this Article has demonstrated that
the public trust doctrine of Glass has the limitation of sovereignty
at its core. The Illinois Central aspect of the public trust was in play
in Glass,224 but more of the majority opinion in Glass was devoted to
examining the proper interpretation of the Michigan precedents
and showing that the court of appeals had erred in its use of
precedent.
225
The first half step beyond that is to make it even clearer that
there is explicit content to the public trust doctrine that is obliga-
tory for the states, and to give that limit some definition. The
harder test case is one in which the United States Supreme Court
219. See, e.g., Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58, 62 (Mich. 2005).
220. Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 188 (Mich. 2005).
221. Goeckel v. Glass, 126 S. Ct. 1340 (2006) (mem.).
222. See discussion supra notes 167-169.
223. See discussion supra notes 24-25.
224. See Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58, 62 (Mich. 2005).
225. Id. at 64-66, 68-76.
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would have to independently establish a public trust threshold that
could not be altered by the sovereign actions of any state. Although
the Court found a definite limit in Illinois Central, that case came to
the Supreme Court in a posture where the state, like the English
Crown had done centuries before, was invoking the limitation on
its own power.2 2 6 By the 1873 revocation of the earlier grant to the
railroad, Illinois, as sovereign, effectively agreed that the public
trust placed a limitation on its sovereignty.227 When a case is pre-
sented in which the state is claiming that it has chosen to allow a
major alienation of public trust rights, it will be both different and
the same. In deciding a case in which the state denies a trust vio-
lation, the Court obviously cannot rely on the state's concurrence
that the trust has been violated. Even so, as explicitly stated in
Shively v. Bowlby:
"In ... Illinois Cent. R. Ct. v. Illinois ... it was recognized as
the settled law of this country that the ownership of, and do-
minion and sovereignty over, lands covered by tide waters, or
navigable lakes, within the limits of the several states, belong
to the respective states within which they are found, with the
consequent right to use or dispose of any portion thereof,
when that can be done without substantial impairment of the interest
226. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 448 (1892). The case was precipitated by
the act of the 1873 Illinois legislature that attempted to revoke the 1869 grant. Id.
227. See id. at 452. Mr.Justice Field put the matter this way:
The question, therefore, to be considered, is whether the legislature was competent
to thus deprive the state of its ownership of the submerged lands in the harbor of
Chicago, and of the consequent control of its waters; or, in other words, whether the
railroad corporation can hold the lands and control the waters by the grant, against
any future exercise of power over them by the state.
Id.; see also id. at 453-54.
228. No state has yet attempted to abnegate the foreshore public trust in large measure.
Idaho, however, has by legislation taken what may amount to a similar denial of trust. In
1995, following two court decisions limiting appropriations as a function of the public trust,
the legislature expressly forbade use of the public trust as a limit on appropriation or use of
water in that state. See IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 58-1201-1203 (2006). See also Michael C. Blumm
et al., Renouncing the Public Trust Doctrine: An Assessment of the Validity of Idaho House Bill 794,
24 ECOLOGY. L. Q. 461 (1997) (offering a critical assessment of the Idaho legislature's ac-
tion). The Idaho action is a marked contrast to that taken in California. In California, the
issue arose in the famous Mono Lake case. Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Super. Ct., 658 P.2d 709
(Cal. 1983) (en banc). In that case the California Supreme Court said that the trust might
be released when a paramount state interest, such as the security of prior appropriation
water rights might be in jeopardy, but found no sufficiently authorized or explicit state ac-
tion doing so. Id. at 712. Thereafter, the authorized state entities declined to release those
water rights from the trust. See generally Cynthia L. Koehler, Water Rights and the Public Trust
Doctrine: Resolution of the Mono Lake Controversy, 22 ECOLOGY L. Q. 541 (1995).
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of the public in such waters, and subject to the paramount right
of congress to control their navigation so far as may be neces-
sary for the regulation of commerce.
2
2
9
In this half step, the Court will have to explicate the constitutional
authority for its ability to intervene to "correct" the state's view of
its authority over its property law. Professor Wilkinson has, cor-
rectly in my view, explained why there is federal authority here, °
but the Court has never had to assert and exercise that power.
The second half step is somewhat easier, but still a bit novel. Vir-
tually all public trust cases have involved legislative, executive, or
administrative actions that are challenged in the courts as violative
of the public trust. What Glass v. Goeckel posed was a judicial inter-
pretation of the state's property law that was asserted to violate the
public trust. As noted earlier, the correction of that error elimi-
nated the necessity to delve into the question of whether courts
can violate the public trust by their property law pronounce-
ments.2 3 1 However, with respect to judicial takings, Professor
Thompson has, correctly in my opinion, explained why courts can
take property when they radically redefine property rights.23 2 It
seems reasonable then that the same logic that supports judicial
redefinitions of property rights as potential takings applies to judi-
cial redefinitions as violations of the public trust, but there is
neither scholarship nor precedent that addresses the issue. A sec-
ond source of doubt regarding judicial takings is similar to the
federalism concern-there is no law on the subject of judicial vio-
lations of the public trust. That may make the Supreme Court
hesitant to take such a case. Looking at judicial takings as a paral-
lel, the Court has avoided accepting or deciding cases on that
ground.
The Michigan Supreme Court in Glass v. Goeckel issued a major
public trust decision. It preserves longstanding public use in
Michigan. By its precedential value, the decision protects public
use throughout the Great Lakes against extirpation by radically
229. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 46-47 (1894) (emphasis added) (citing Illinois Cent.
R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435-37, 465, 474).
230. See Wilkinson, supra note 33, at 454-64.
231. See discussion supra notes 24-25.
232. See Barton H. Thompson,Jr.,Judicial 7akings, 76 VA. L. REv. 1449, 1541-44 (1990).
233. See, e.g., Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290 (1967) (avoiding judicial takings issue
raised by Justice Stewart's concurrence); Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 753 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1985),
vacated, 477 U.S. 902 (1986) (vacating the judicial takings claim and remanding on ripeness
grounds).
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ill-conceived and erroneous judicial action. In many ways, it should
have been an easy case due to the longstanding public uses that
were so widely made. It should have been no case at all, and
Goeckel himself conceded as much. The fact that it was neither
easy nor dead on arrival ought to be a warning that public rights
are always in potential jeopardy. The public trust doctrine has an
extraordinary pedigree and extraordinary reach, but the full scope
of its protection against governmental abandonment of public in-
terests is not yet established law. Perhaps those chapters of its
future history will never need to be written. For now, celebrate
Glass v. Goeckel, but also prepare.
